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Abstract
Graph aggregation is the process of computing a single output graph
that constitutes a good compromise between several input graphs, each
provided by a different source. One needs to perform graph aggregation in
a wide variety of situations, e.g., when applying a voting rule (graphs as
preference orders), when consolidating conflicting views regarding the re-
lationships between arguments in a debate (graphs as abstract argumenta-
tion frameworks), or when computing a consensus between several alterna-
tive clusterings of a given dataset (graphs as equivalence relations). In this
paper, we introduce a formal framework for graph aggregation grounded
in social choice theory. Our focus is on understanding which properties
shared by the individual input graphs will transfer to the output graph re-
turned by a given aggregation rule. We consider both common properties
of graphs, such as transitivity and reflexivity, and arbitrary properties ex-
pressible in certain fragments of modal logic. Our results establish several
connections between the types of properties preserved under aggregation
and the choice-theoretic axioms satisfied by the rules used. The most
important of these results is a powerful impossibility theorem that gener-
alises Arrow’s seminal result for the aggregation of preference orders to a
large collection of different types of graphs.
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1 Introduction
Suppose each of the members of a group of autonomous agents provides us with
a different directed graph that is defined on a common set of vertices. Graph
aggregation is the task of computing a single graph over the same set of vertices
that, in some sense, represents a good compromise between the various individ-
ual views expressed by the agents. Graphs are ubiquitous in computer science
and artificial intelligence (AI). For example, in the context of decision support
systems, an edge from vertex x to vertex y might indicate that alternative x is
preferred to alternative y. In the context of modelling interactions taking place
on an online debating platform, an edge from x to y might indicate that argu-
ment x undercuts or otherwise attacks argument y. And in the context of social
network analysis, an edge from x to y might express that person x is influenced
by person y. How to best perform graph aggregation is a relevant question in
these three domains, as well as in any other domain where graphs are used as a
modelling tool and where particular graphs may be supplied by different agents
or originate from different sources. For example, in an election, i.e., in a group
decision making context, we have to aggregate the preferences of several voters.
In a debate, we sometimes have to aggregate the views of the individual par-
ticipants in the debate. And when trying to understand the dynamics within
a community, we sometimes have to aggregate information coming from several
different social networks.
In this paper, we introduce a formal framework for studying graph aggrega-
tion in general abstract terms and we discuss in detail how this general frame-
work can be instantiated to specific application scenarios. We introduce a num-
ber of concrete methods for performing aggregation, but more importantly, our
framework provides tools for evaluating what constitutes a “good” method of
aggregation and it allows us to ask questions regarding the existence of methods
that meet a certain set of requirements. Our approach is inspired by work in
social choice theory [Arrow et al., 2002], which offers a rich framework for the
study of aggregation rules for preferences—a very specific class of graphs. In
particular, we adopt the axiomatic method used in social choice theory, as well
as other parts of economic theory, to identify intuitively desirable properties of
aggregation methods, to define them in mathematically precise terms, and to
systematically explore their logical consequences.
An aggregation rule maps any given profile of graphs, one for each agent, into
a single graph, which we will often refer to as the collective graph. The central
concept we focus on in this paper is the collective rationality of aggregation
rules with respect to certain properties of graphs. Suppose we consider an
agent rational only if the graph she provides has certain properties, such as
being reflexive or transitive. Then we say that a given aggregation rule F
is collectively rational with respect to that property of interest if and only
if F can guarantee that that property is preserved during aggregation. For
example, if we aggregate individual graphs by computing their union (i.e., if
we include an edge from x to y in our collective graph if at least one of the
individual graphs includes that edge), then it is easy to see that the property of
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reflexivity will always transfer. On the other hand, the property of transitivity
will not always transfer. For example, if we aggregate two graphs over the
set of vertices V = {x, y, z}, one consisting only of the edge (x, y) and one
consisting only of the edge (y, z), then although each of these two graphs is
(vacuously) transitive, their union is not, as it is missing the edge (x, z). Thus,
the union rule is collectively rational with respect to reflexivity, but not with
respect to transitivity. We study collective rationality with respect to some such
well-known and widely used properties of graphs, but also with respect to large
families of graph properties that satisfy certain meta-properties. We explore
both a semantic and a syntactic approach to defining such meta-properties. In
our semantic approach, we identify certain high-level features of graph properties
that determine the kind of aggregation rules that are collectively rational with
respect to them. For example, transitivity is what we call an “implicative”
property: under certain circumstances (namely in the presence of an edge from
x to y), the inclusion of an edge from y to z implies the inclusion of an edge
from x to z. In our syntactic approach, we consider graph properties that can
be expressed in particular syntactic fragments of a logical language. To this
end, we make use of the language of modal logic [Blackburn et al., 2001]. This
allows us to establish links between the syntactic properties of the language
used to express the integrity constraints we would like to see preserved during
aggregation and the axiomatic properties of the rules used.
We prove both possibility and impossibility results. A possibility result estab-
lishes that every aggregation rule belonging to a certain class of rules (typically
defined in terms of certain axioms) is collectively rational with respect to all
graph properties that satisfy a certain meta-property. An impossibility result,
on the other hand, establishes that it is impossible to define an aggregation rule
belonging to a certain class that would be collectively rational with respect to
any graph property that meets a certain meta-property—or that the only such
aggregation rules would be clearly very unattractive for other reasons. Our main
result is such an impossibility theorem. It is a generalisation of Arrow’s seminal
result for preference aggregation [Arrow, 1963]. Arrow’s Theorem says that no
aggregation rule that satisfies the Pareto principle and that is independent of
irrelevant alternatives can be guaranteed to always preserve the transitivity and
completeness of the preference orders being aggregated. Here, the Pareto prin-
ciple stipulates that the aggregation rule should respect any unanimously held
strict preferences over pairs of alternatives (thus, if all individuals rank x above
y, so should the rule). The independence property expresses that it should be
possible to decide on the relative rankings of alternatives in a pair-by-pair fash-
ion (thus, to decide whether x should be ranked above y, the rule should only
have to consider the relative rankings of x and y provided by the individuals,
rather than, say, how they rank x and z). The only exceptions admitted by
Arrow’s Theorem are rules for fewer than three alternatives and rules that are
dictatorial, in the sense of always returning the preference order of one specific
agent (the dictator). Our approach of working with meta-properties has two
advantages. First, it permits us to give conceptually simple proofs for powerful
results with a high degree of generality. Second, it makes it easy to instantiate
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our general results to obtain specific results for specific application scenarios.
For example, Arrow’s Theorem follows immediately from our more general re-
sult by checking that the properties of graphs that represent preference orders
satisfy the meta-properties featuring in our theorem, yet our proof of the general
theorem is arguably simpler than a direct proof of Arrow’s Theorem. This is
so, because the meta-properties we use very explicitly exhibit specific features
required for the proof, while those features are somewhat hidden in the specific
properties of transitivity and completeness. Similarly, we show how alternative
instantiations of our general result easily generate both known and new results
in other domains, such as the aggregation of plausibility orders (which has ap-
plications in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief merging) and the aggregation
of equivalence relations (which has applications in clustering analysis).
Our work builds on and is related to contributions in the field of so-
cial choice theory, starting with the seminal contribution of Arrow [1963].
This concerns, in particular, contributions to the theory of voting and pref-
erence aggregation [Fishburn, 1970, Kirman and Sondermann, 1972, Hansson,
1976, Sen, 1986, Pini et al., 2009, Arrow et al., 2002], but also judgment ag-
gregation [List and Pettit, 2002, Ga¨rdenfors, 2006, Dietrich and List, 2007a,
Dokow and Holzman, 2010, Herzberg and Eckert, 2012, Grandi and Endriss,
2013, List and Puppe, 2009]. In fact, in terms of levels of generality, graph
aggregation may be regarded as occupying the middle ground between prefer-
ence aggregation (most specific) and judgment aggregation (most general). In
computer science, these frameworks are studied in the field of computational
social choice [Brandt et al., 2016]. As we shall discuss in some detail, graph
aggregation is an abstraction of several more specific forms of aggregation tak-
ing place in a wide range of different domains. Preference aggregation is but
one example. Aggregation of specific types of graphs has been studied, for
instance, in nonmonotonic reasoning [Doyle and Wellman, 1991], belief merg-
ing [Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann, 2003], social network analysis [White et al.,
1976], clustering [Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1986], and argumentation in mul-
tiagent systems [Tohme´ et al., 2008]. As we shall see, several of the results
obtained in these earlier contributions are simple corollaries of our general re-
sults on graph aggregation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce our framework for graph aggregation. This includes the discussion of
several application scenarios, the definition of a number of concrete aggregation
rules, and the formulation of various axioms identifying intuitively desirable
properties of such rules. It also includes the definition of the concept of col-
lective rationality. Finally, we prove a number of basic results in Section 2:
characterisation results linking rules and axioms, as well as possibility results
linking axioms and collective rationality requirements. In Section 3, we present
our impossibility results for graph aggregation rules that are collectively ra-
tional with respect to graph properties meeting certain semantically defined
meta-properties. There are two such results. One identifies conditions under
which the only available rules are so-called oligarchies, under which the outcome
is always the intersection of the graphs provided by a subset of the agents (the
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oligarchs). A second result shows that, under slightly stronger assumptions, the
only available rules are the dictatorships, where a single agent completely deter-
mines the outcome for every possible profile. Much of Section 3 is devoted to
the definition and illustration of the meta-properties featuring in these results.
Once they are in place, the proofs are relatively simple. In Section 4, we intro-
duce our approach to describing collective rationality requirements in syntactic
terms, using the language of modal logic. Our results in Section 4 establish
simple conditions on the syntax of the specification of a graph property that
are sufficient for guaranteeing that the property in question will be preserved
under aggregation. The grounding of our approach in modal logic also allows
us to provide a deeper analysis of the concept of collective rationality by con-
sidering the preservation of properties at three different levels, corresponding to
the three levels naturally defined by the notions of Kripke frame, Kripke model,
and possible world, respectively. In Section 5, we discuss four of our application
scenarios in more detail, focusing on application scenarios previously discussed
in the AI literature. We show how our general results allow us to derive new
simple proofs of known results, how they clarify the status of some of these
results, and how they allow us to obtain new results in these domains of ap-
plication. Section 6, finally, concludes with a brief summary of our results and
pointers to possible directions for future work.
2 Graph Aggregation
In this section, we introduce a simple framework for graph aggregation. The ba-
sic definitions are given in Section 2.1. While this is a general framework that
is independent of specific application scenarios and specific choices regarding
the aggregation rule used, we briefly discuss several such specific scenarios in
Section 2.2 and suggest definitions for several specific aggregation rules in Sec-
tion 2.3. We then approach the analysis of aggregation rules from two different
but complementary angles. First, in Section 2.4, we define several axiomatic
properties of aggregation rules that a user may wish to impose as requirements
when looking for a “fair” or “well-behaved” aggregation rule for a specific appli-
cation. We also prove a number of simple results that show how some of these
axioms relate to each other and to some of the aggregation rules defined earlier.
Second, in Section 2.5, we introduce the central concept of collective rationality
and we prove a number of simple positive results that show how enforcing cer-
tain axioms allows us to guarantee collective rationality with respect to certain
graph properties.
2.1 Basic Notation and Terminology
Fix a finite set of vertices V. A (directed) graph G = 〈V,E〉 based on V is
defined by a set of edges E ⊆ V ×V . We write xEy for (x, y) ∈ E. As V is
fixed, G is in fact fully determined by E. We therefore identify sets of edges
E ⊆ V ×V with the graphs G = 〈V,E〉 they define. For any kind of set S,
5
Property First-Order Condition
Reflexivity ∀x.xEx
Irreflexivity ¬∃x.xEx
Symmetry ∀xy.(xEy → yEx)
Antisymmetry ∀xy.(xEy ∧ yEx→ x = y)
Right Euclidean ∀xyz.[(xEy ∧ xEz)→ yEz]
Left Euclidean ∀xyz.[(xEy ∧ zEy)→ zEx]
Transitivity ∀xyz.[(xEy ∧ yEz)→ xEz]
Negative Transitivity ∀xyz.[xEy → (xEz ∨ zEy)]
Connectedness ∀xyz.[(xEy ∧ xEz)→ (yEz ∨ zEy)]
Completeness ∀xy.[x 6= y → (xEy ∨ yEx)]
Nontriviality ∃xy.xEy
Seriality ∀x.∃y.xEy
Table 1: Common properties of directed graphs.
we use 2S to denote the powerset of S. So 2V×V is the set of all graphs. We
use E(x) := {y ∈ V | (x, y) ∈ E} to denote the set of successors of a vertex x
in a set of edges E and E−1(y) := {x ∈ V | (x, y) ∈ E} to denote the set of
predecessors of y in E.
A given graph may or may not satisfy a specific property, such as transitivity
or reflexivity. Table 1 recalls the definitions of several such properties.1 We
will often be interested in families of graphs that all satisfy several of these
properties. For instance, a weak order is a directed graph that is reflexive,
transitive, and complete. It will often be useful to think of a graph property
P , such as transitivity, as a subset of 2V×V (the set of all graphs over the set
of vertices V ). For two disjoint sets of edges S+ and S− and a graph property
P ⊆ 2V×V , let P [S+, S−] = {E ∈ P | S+ ⊆ E and S− ∩ E = ∅} denote the set
of graphs in P that include all of the edges in S+ and none of those in S−.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of (two or more) individuals (or agents).
We will often refer to subsets of N as coalitions of individuals. Suppose every
individual i ∈ N specifies a graph Ei ⊆ V ×V. This gives rise to a profile
E = (E1, . . . , En). We use N
E
e := {i ∈ N | e ∈ Ei} to denote the coalition of
individuals accepting edge e under profile E.
Definition 1. An aggregation rule is a function F : (2V×V )n → 2V×V , map-
1Some of these may be less well known than others, so let us briefly review the less familiar
definitions. The two Euclidean properties encode Euclid’s idea that “things which equal the
same thing also equal one another”. Negative transitivity, a property commonly assumed
in the economics literature on preferences, may equivalently be expressed as ∀xyz.[(¬xEy ∧
¬yEz) → ¬xEz], which explains the name of the property. Completeness requires any two
distinct vertices to be related one way or the other. Connectedness only requires two (not
necessarily distinct) vertices to be related one way or the other if they are both reachable from
some common predecessor (the term “connectedness” is commonly used in the modal logic
literature [Blackburn et al., 2001]). Nontriviality excludes the empty graph, while seriality
(also a term used in the modal logic literature) requires every vertex to have at least one
successor.
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ping any given profile of individual graphs into a single graph.
We will sometimes denote the outcome F (E) obtained when applying an aggre-
gation rule F to a profile E simply as E and refer to it as the collective graph.
An example for an aggregation rule is the majority rule, accepting a given edge
if and only if more than half of the individuals accept it. More examples will
be provided in Section 2.3.
2.2 Examples of Application Scenarios
Directed graphs are ubiquitous in computer science and beyond. They have
been used as modelling devices for a wide range of applications. We now sketch
a number of different application scenarios for graph aggregation, each requir-
ing different types of graphs (satisfying different properties) to model relevant
objects of interest, and each requiring different types of aggregation rules.
Example 1 (Preferences). Our main example for a graph aggregation prob-
lem will be preference aggregation as classically studied in social choice the-
ory [Arrow, 1963]. In this context, vertices are interpreted as alternatives avail-
able in an election and the graphs considered are weak orders on these alter-
natives, interpreted as preference orders. Our aggregation rules then reduce to
so-called social welfare functions. Social welfare functions, which return a pref-
erence order for every profile of individual preference orders, are similar objects
as voting rules, which only return a winning alternative for every profile. While
the types of preferences typically considered in classical social choice theory are
required to be complete, recent work in AI has also addressed the aggregation of
partial preference orders [Pini et al., 2009], corresponding to a larger family of
graphs than the weak orders. In the context of aggregating complex preferences
defined over combinatorial domains, graph aggregation can also be used to de-
cide which preferential dependencies between different variables one should try
to respect, based on the dependencies reported by the individual decision mak-
ers [Airiau et al., 2011].
Example 2 (Knowledge). If we think of V as a set of possible worlds, then a
graph on V that is reflexive and transitive (and possibly also symmetric) can
be used to model an agent’s knowledge: (x, y) being an edge means that, if x
is the actual world, then our agent will consider y a possible world [Hintikka,
1962]. If we aggregate the graphs of several agents by taking their intersection,
then the resulting collective graph represents the distributed knowledge of the
group, i.e., the knowledge the members of the group can infer by pooling all their
individual resources. If, on the other hand, we aggregate by taking the union
of the individual graphs, then we obtain what is sometimes called the shared
or mutual knowledge of the individual agents, i.e., the part of the knowledge
available to each and every individual on their own. Finally, if we aggregate by
computing the transitive closure of the union of the individual graphs, then we
obtain a model of the group’s common knowledge [Egre´, 2011, p. 512]. These
concepts play a role in disciplines as diverse as epistemology [Lewis, 1996], game
theory [Aumann, 1976], and distributed systems [Halpern and Moses, 1990].
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Example 3 (Nonmonotonic reasoning). When an intelligent agent attempts to
update her beliefs or to decide what action to take, she may resort to several
patterns of common-sense inference that will sometimes be in conflict with each
other. To take a famous example, we may wish to infer that Nixon is a pacifist,
because he is a Quaker and Quakers by default are pacifists, and we may at the
same time wish to infer that Nixon is not a pacifist, because he is a Republican
and Republicans by default are not pacifists. In a popular approach to nonmono-
tonic reasoning in AI, such default inference rules are modelled as graphs that
encode the relative plausibility of different conclusions [Shoham, 1987]. Thus,
here the possible conclusions are the vertices and we obtain a graph by linking
one vertex with another, if the former is considered at least as plausible as the
latter. Conflict resolution between different rules of inference then requires us
to aggregate such plausibility orders, to be able to determine what the ultimately
most plausible state of the world might be [Doyle and Wellman, 1991].
Example 4 (Social networks). We may also think of each of the graphs in
a profile as a different social network relating members of the same popula-
tion. One of these networks might describe work relations, another might model
family relations, and a third might have been induced from similarities in on-
line purchasing behaviour. Social networks are often modelled using undirected
graphs, which we can simulate in our framework by requiring all graphs to be
symmetric. Aggregating individual graphs then amounts to finding a single meta-
network that describes relationships at a global level. Alternatively, we may wish
to aggregate several graphs representing snapshots of the same social network at
different points in time. The meta-network obtained can be helpful when studying
the social structures within the population under scrutiny [White et al., 1976].
Example 5 (Clustering). Clustering is the attempt of partitioning a given set
of data points into several clusters. The intention is that the data points in the
same cluster should be more similar to each other than each of them is to data
points belonging to one of the other clusters. This is useful in many disciplines,
including information retrieval and molecular biology, to name but two examples.
However, the field is lacking a precise definition of what constitutes a “correct”
partitioning of the data and there are many different clustering algorithms, such
as k-means or single-linkage clustering, and even more parameterisations of
those basic algorithms [Tan et al., 2005]. Observe that every partitioning that
might get returned by a clustering algorithm induces an equivalence relation
(i.e., a graph that is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive): two data points are
equivalent if and only if they belong to the same cluster. Finding a compromise
between the solutions suggested by several clustering algorithms is what is known
as consensus clustering [Gionis et al., 2007]. This thus amounts to aggregating
several graphs that are equivalence relations.
Example 6 (Argumentation). In a so-called abstract argumentation framework,
arguments are taken to be vertices in a graph and attacks between arguments
are modelled as directed edges between them [Dung, 1995]. A graph property
of interest in this context is acyclicity, as that makes it easier to decide which
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arguments to ultimately accept. If we think of V as the collection of arguments
proposed in a debate, a profile E = (E1, . . . , En) specifies an attack relation
for each of a number of agents that we may wish to aggregate into a collective
attack relation before attempting to determine which of the arguments might be
acceptable to the group. Recent work has addressed the challenge of aggregat-
ing several abstract argumentation frameworks from a number of angles, e.g.,
by proposing concrete aggregation methods grounded in work on belief merging
[Coste-Marquis et al., 2007], by investigating the computational complexity of
aggregation [Dunne et al., 2012], and by analysing what kinds of profiles we
may reasonably expect to encounter in this context [Airiau et al., 2016].
Example 7 (Logic). Graph aggregation is also at the core of recent work on
the aggregation of different logics [Wen and Liu, 2013]. The central idea here
is that every logic is defined by a consequence relation between formulas. Thus,
given a set of formulas, we can think of a logic L as the graph corresponding to
the consequence relation defining L. Aggregating several such graphs then gives
rise to a new logic. Thus, this is an instance of our graph aggregation problem,
except that for the case of logic aggregation it is more natural to model the set
of vertices as being infinite.2
Recall that we have assumed that every individual specifies a graph on the
same set of vertices V . This is a natural assumption to make in all of our
examples above, but in general we might also be interested in aggregating
graphs defined on different sets of vertices. For instance, Coste-Marquis et
al. [Coste-Marquis et al., 2007] have argued that, in the context of merging ar-
gumentation frameworks, the case of agents who are not all aware of the exact
same set of arguments is of great practical interest. Observe that also in this
case our framework is applicable, as we may think of V as the union of all the
individual sets of vertices (with each individual only providing edges involving
“her” vertices).
We will return to several of these application scenarios in greater detail in
Section 5.
2.3 Aggregation Rules
Next, we define a number of concrete aggregation rules. We begin with three
that are particularly simple, the first of which we have already introduced in-
formally.
Definition 2. The (strict) majority rule is the aggregation Fmaj with Fmaj :
E 7→ {e ∈ V ×V : |NEe | >
n
2 }.
2All results reported in this paper remain true if we permit graphs with infinite sets V of
vertices. However, for ease of exposition and as most applications are more naturally modelled
using finite graphs, we do not explore this generalisation here. The finiteness of the set N of
agents, however, is crucial. It will be exploited in the proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9 below, on
which all of our theorems rely.
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Definition 3. The intersection rule is the aggregation rule F∩ with F∩ :
E 7→ E1 ∩ · · · ∩ En.
Definition 4. The union rule is the aggregation rule F∪ with F∪ : E 7→
E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En.
In related contexts, the intersection rule is also known as the unanimity rule,
as it requires unanimous approval from all individuals for an edge to be ac-
cepted. Similarly, the union rule is a nomination rule, as nomination by just
one individual is enough for an edge to get accepted.
Under a quota rule, an edge will be included in the collective graph if the
number of individuals accepting it meets a certain quota. A uniform quota rule
uses the same quota for every edge.
Definition 5. A quota rule is an aggregation rule Fq defined via a function
q : V ×V → {0, 1, . . . , n+1}, associating each edge with a quota, by stipulating
Fq : E 7→ {e ∈ V ×V : |NEe | > q(e)}. Fq is called uniform in case q is a
constant function.
The class of uniform quota rules includes the three simple rules we have seen
earlier as special cases: the (strict) majority rule Fmaj is the uniform quota rule
with q = ⌈n+12 ⌉, the intersection rule F∩ is the uniform quota rule with q = n,
and the union rule F∪ is the uniform quota rule with q = 1. We call the uniform
quota rules with q = 0 and q = n+1 the trivial quota rules; q = 0 means that
all edges will be included in the collective graph and q = n+1 means that no
edge will be included (independently of the profile encountered). The idea of
using quota rules is natural and widespread. For example, quota rules have also
been studied in judgment aggregation [Dietrich and List, 2007a].
We now introduce a new class of aggregation rules specifically designed for
graphs that is inspired by approval voting [Brams and Fishburn, 2007]. Imagine
we associate with each vertex an election in which all the possible successors of
that vertex are the candidates (and in which there may be more than one win-
ner). Each individual votes by stating which vertices they consider acceptable
successors.
Definition 6. A successor-approval rule is an aggregation rule Fv defined
via a function v : (2V )n → 2V , associating each profile of approval sets of
vertices with a winning set of vertices, by stipulating F : E 7→ {(x, y) ∈ V ×V |
y ∈ v(E1(x), . . . , En(x))}.
We call v the choice function associated with Fv. It takes a vector of sets
of vertices, one for each agent, and returns another such set. We will only
be interested in choice functions v that are (i) anonymous and (ii) neutral,
i.e., for which (i) v(S1, . . . , Sn) = v(Sπ(1), . . . , Sπ(n)) for any permutation pi :
N → N and for which (ii) {i ∈ N | x ∈ Si} = {i ∈ N | y ∈ Si} entails
x ∈ v(S1, . . . , Sn) ⇔ y ∈ v(S1, . . . , Sn). There are a number of natural choices
for v. For example, if we use the classical approval voting rule v : (S1, . . . , Sn) 7→
argmaxx∈V |{i ∈ N : x ∈ Si}|, we end up accepting for each vertex those
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outgoing edges that have maximal support. Alternatively, we might want to
accept all edges receiving above-average support. While classical approval voting
will typically result in very “sparse” output graphs, intuitively the latter rule
will return graphs that have similar attributes as the input graphs. A third
option is to use “even-and-equal” cumulative voting with v : (S1, . . . , Sn) 7→
argmaxx∈V
∑
i|x∈Si
1
|Si|
, i.e., to let each individual distribute her weight evenly
over the successors she approves of. This would be attractive, for instance,
under an epistemic interpretation, where agents specifying fewer edges might be
considered more certain about those edges.3 Finally, observe that the uniform
quota rules (but not the general quota rules) are a special case of the successor-
approval rules. We obtain Fq with the constant function q : e 7→ k, mapping
any given edge to the fixed quota k, by using v : (S1, . . . , Sn) 7→ {x ∈ V : |{i ∈
N : x ∈ Si}| > k}.
While we will not do so in this paper, it is also possible to adapt
the distance-based rules—familiar from preference aggregation, belief merg-
ing, and judgment aggregation [Kemeny, 1959, Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez,
2002, Miller and Osherson, 2009]—to the case of graph aggregation. Such
rules select a collective graph that satisfies certain properties and that min-
imises the distance to the individual graphs (for a suitable notion of dis-
tance and a suitable form of aggregating such distances). A downside of
this approach is that distance-based rules are typically computationally in-
tractable [Hemaspaandra et al., 2005, Endriss et al., 2012, Lang and Slavkovik,
2014, Endriss and de Haan, 2015], while quota and successor-approval rules have
very low complexity.
We can also adapt the representative-voter rules [Endriss and Grandi, 2014a]
to the case of graph aggregation. Here, the idea is to return one of the input
graphs as the output, and for every profile to pick the input graph that in some
sense is “most representative” of the views of the group.
Definition 7. A representative-voter rule is an aggregation rule F that
is such that for every profile E there exists an individual i⋆ ∈ N such that
F (E) = Ei⋆ .
For instance, we might pick the input graph that is closest to the outcome of
the majority rule. This majority-based representative-voter rule also has very
low complexity. While we will not study any specific representative-voter rule
in this paper, in Section 4.4 we will briefly discuss this class of rules as a whole.
We conclude our presentation of concrete (families of) aggregation rules with
a number of rules that, intuitively speaking, are not very attractive.
Definition 8. The dictatorship of individual i⋆ ∈ N is the aggregation rule
Fi⋆ with Fi⋆ : E 7→ Ei⋆ .
3Note that in case no individual graph has any outgoing edges for x, the successor-approval
rules defined in terms of the argmax-operator would accept all edges emanating from x. This
will usually not be desirable and in practice has to be taken care of by defining a suitable
exception.
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Thus, for any given profile of input graphs, Fi⋆ always simply returns the graph
submitted by the dictator i⋆. Note that every dictatorship is a representative-
voter rule, but the converse is not true.
Definition 9. The oligarchy of coalition C⋆ ⊆ N , with C⋆ being nonempty,
is the aggregation rule FC⋆ with FC⋆ : E 7→
⋂
i∈C⋆
Ei.
Thus, FC⋆ always returns the intersection of the graphs submitted by the oli-
garchs in the coalition C⋆. So an individual in C⋆ can veto the acceptance of
any given edge, but she cannot enforce its acceptance. In case C⋆ is a singleton,
we obtain a dictatorship. In case C⋆ = N , we obtain the intersection rule.
2.4 Axiomatic Properties and Basic Characterisation Re-
sults
When choosing an aggregation rule, we need to consider its properties. In
social choice theory, such properties are called axioms [Sen, 1986]. We now
introduce several basic axioms for graph aggregation. The first such axiom is
an independence condition that requires that the decision of whether or not a
given edge e should be part of the collective graph should only depend on which
of the individual graphs include e. This corresponds to well-known axioms in
preference and judgment aggregation [Arrow, 1963, List and Puppe, 2009].
Definition 10. An aggregation rule F is called independent of irrelevant edges
(IIE) if NEe = N
E
′
e implies e ∈ F (E)⇔ e ∈ F (E
′).
That is, if exactly the same individuals accept e under profiles E and E′, then
e should be part of either both or none of the corresponding collective graphs.
The definition above applies to all edges e ∈ V ×V and all pairs of profiles
E,E′ ∈ (2V×V )n. For the sake of readability, we shall leave this kind of universal
quantification implicit also in later definitions.
IEE is a desirable property, because—if it can be satisfied—it greatly sim-
plifies aggregation, in both computational and conceptual terms. As we shall
see, some of the arguably most natural aggregation rules, the quota rules de-
fined earlier, satisfy IIE. At the same time, as we shall also see, IEE is a very
demanding property that is hard to satisfy if we are interested in richer forms
of aggregation. Indeed, IIE will turn out to be at the very centre of our impos-
sibility results.
While very much a standard axiom, we might be dissatisfied with IIE for not
making reference to the fact that edges are defined in terms of vertices. Our next
two axioms are much more graph-specific and do not have close analogues in
preference or judgment aggregation. The first of them requires that the decision
of whether or not to collectively accept a given edge e = (x, y) should only
depend on which edges with the same source x are accepted by the individuals.
That is, acceptance of an edge may be influenced by what agents think about
other edges, but not those edges that are sufficiently unrelated to the edge under
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consideration. Below we write F (E)(x) for the set of successors of vertex x in
the set of edges in the collective graph F (E), and similarly F (E)−1(y) for the
predecessors of y in F (E).
Definition 11. An aggregation F is called independent of irrelevant sources
(IIS) if Ei(x) = E
′
i(x) for all individuals i ∈ N implies F (E)(x) = F (E
′)(x).
Definition 12. An aggregation rule F is called independent of irrelevant targets
(IIT) if E−1i (y) = E
′
i
−1
(y) for all individuals i ∈ N implies F (E)−1(y) =
F (E′)−1(y).
Both IIS and IIT are strictly weaker than IIE. That is, we obtain the following
result, which is easy to verify (simple counterexamples can be devised to show
that the converse does not hold):
Proposition 1. If an aggregation rule is IIE, then it is also both IIS and IIT.
The fundamental economic principle of unanimity requires that an edge should
be accepted by a group in case all individuals in that group accept it.
Definition 13. An aggregation rule F is called unanimous if it is always the
case that F (E) ⊇ E1 ∩ · · · ∩ En.
A requirement that, in some sense, is dual to unanimity is to ask that the
collective graph should only include edges that are part of at least one of the
individual graphs. In the context of ontology aggregation this axiom has been
introduced under the name groundedness [Porello and Endriss, 2014].
Definition 14. An aggregation F is called grounded if it is always the case
that F (E) ⊆ E1 ∪ · · · ∪En.
The next three axioms are standard desiderata and closely modelled on their
counterparts in judgment aggregation [List and Puppe, 2009]. The first two of
them, anonymity and neutrality, are basic symmetry requirements with respect
to individuals and edges, respectively.
Definition 15. An aggregation rule F is called anonymous if
F (E1, . . . , En) = F (Eπ(1), . . . , Eπ(n)) for any permutation pi : N → N .
Definition 16. An aggregation rule F is called neutral if NEe = N
E
e′ implies
e ∈ F (E)⇔ e′ ∈ F (E).
Definition 17. An aggregation rule F is called monotonic if E′i \ Ei ⊆ {e}
for all individuals i ∈ N implies e ∈ F (E)⇒ e ∈ F (E′).
Observe that E′i \ Ei ⊆ {e} for all i ∈ N means that the profiles E and E
′ are
identical, except that some individuals who do not accept edge e in the former
profile do accept it in the latter.
The link between aggregation rules and axiomatic properties is expressed in
so-called characterisation results. For each rule (or class of rules), the aim is to
find a set of axioms that uniquely define this rule (or class of rules, respectively).
A simple adaptation of a result by Dietrich and List [2007a] yields the following
characterisation of the class of quota rules:
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Proposition 2. An aggregation rule is a quota rule if and only if it is anony-
mous, monotonic, and IIE.
Proof. To prove the left-to-right direction we simply have to verify that the
quota rules all have these three properties. For the right-to-left direction, ob-
serve that, to accept a given edge (x, y) in the collective graph, an IIE aggre-
gation rule will only look at the set of individuals i such that xEiy. If the rule
is also anonymous, then the acceptance decision is based only on the number of
individuals accepting the edge. Finally, by monotonicity, there will be some min-
imal number of individual acceptances required to trigger collective acceptance.
That number is the quota associated with the edge under consideration.
If we add the axiom of neutrality, then we obtain the class of uniform quota rules.
If we furthermore impose unanimity and groundedness, then this excludes the
trivial quota rules. Similarly, it is easy to verify that IIS essentially characterises
the class of successor-approval rules:
Proposition 3. An aggregation rule is a successor-approval rule (with an
anonymous and neutral choice function) if and only if it is anonymous, neutral,
and IIS.
An extreme form of violating anonymity is to use a dictatorial or an oligarchic
aggregation rule, i.e., a rule that is either a dictatorship or an oligarchy (unless
the oligarchy in question is the full set N ).
Sometimes we will only be interested in the properties of an aggregation rule
as far as the nonreflexive edges e = (x, y) with x 6= y are concerned. Specifically,
we call F neutral on nonreflexive edges (or just NR-neutral) if NE(x,y) = N
E
(x′,y′)
implies (x, y) ∈ F (E)⇔ (x′, y′) ∈ F (E) for all x 6= y and x′ 6= y′. Analogously,
we call F dictatorial on nonreflexive edges (or NR-dictatorial) if there exists an
individual i⋆ ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ F (E)⇔ (x, y) ∈ Ei⋆ for all x 6= y. Finally,
we call F oligarchic on nonreflexive edges (or NR-oligarchic) if there exists a
nonempty coalition C⋆ ⊆ N such that (x, y) ∈ F (E) ⇔ (x, y) ∈
⋂
i∈C⋆ Ei for
all x 6= y.
2.5 Collective Rationality and Basic Possibility Results
To what extent can a given aggregation rule ensure that a given property that is
satisfied by each of the individual input graphs will be preserved during aggre-
gation? This question relates to a well-studied concept in social choice theory,
often referred to as collective rationality [Arrow, 1963, List and Pettit, 2002]. In
the literature, collective rationality is usually defined with respect to a specific
property that should be preserved (e.g., the transitivity of preferences or the
logical consistency of judgments). Here, instead, we formulate a definition that
is parametric with respect to a given graph property.4
4In previous work on binary aggregation, a variant of judgment aggregation, we have used
the term collective rationality in the same sense, with the property to be preserved under
aggregation being encoded in the form of an integrity constraint [Grandi and Endriss, 2013].
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Definition 18. An aggregation rule F is called collectively rational with
respect to a graph property P if F (E) satisfies P whenever all of the individual
graphs in E = (E1, . . . , En) do.
To illustrate the concept, let us consider two examples. Both concern the major-
ity rule, but different graph properties. The first is a purely abstract example,
while the second has a natural interpretation of graphs as preference relations.
Example 8 (Collective rationality). Suppose three individuals provide us with
three graphs over the same set V = {x, y, z, w} of four vertices, as shown to the
left of the dashed line below:
x y z
w
x y z
w
x y z
w
x y z
w
If we apply the majority rule, then we obtain the graph to the right of the dashed
line. Thus, the majority rule is not collectively rational with respect to seriality,
as each individual graph is serial, but the collective graph is not. Symmetry, on
the other hand, is preserved in this example.
Example 9 (Condorcet paradox). Now suppose three individuals provide us
with the three graphs on the set of vertices V = {x, y, z} shown on the lefthand
side of the dashed line below:
x
y z
x
y z
x
y z
x
y z
The graph on the righthand side is once again the result of applying the majority
rule. Observe that each of the three input graphs is transitive and complete. So
we may interpret these graphs as (strict) preference orders on the candidates x,
y, and z. For example, the preferences of the first agent would be x ≻ y ≻ z.
The output graph, on the other hand, is not transitive (although it is complete).
It does not correspond to a “rational” preference, as under that preference we
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should prefer x to y and y to z, but also z to x. This is the famous Condorcet
paradox described by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 [McLean and Urken,
1995].
So the majority rule is not collectively rational with respect to either seriality
or transitivity. On the other hand, we saw that both symmetry and complete-
ness were preserved under the majority rule—at least for the specific examples
considered here. In fact, it is not difficult to verify that this was no coincidence,
and that the majority rule is collectively rational with respect to a number of
properties of interest.
Fact 4. The majority rule is collectively rational with respect to reflexivity,
irreflexivity, symmetry, and antisymmetry. In case n, the number of individu-
als, is odd, the majority rule furthermore is collectively rational with respect to
completeness and connectedness.
Proof sketch. We give the proofs for symmetry and completeness. The other
proofs are very similar. First, if the input graphs are symmetric, then the set of
supporters of edge (x, y) is always identical to the set of supporters of the edge
(y, z). Thus, either both or neither have a strict majority. Second, if the input
graphs are complete, then each of them must include at least one of (x, y) and
(y, x). Thus, by the pigeon hole principle, when n is odd, at least one of these
two edges must have a strict majority.
Rather than establishing further such results for specific aggregation rules, our
main interest in this paper is the connection between the axioms satisfied by
an aggregation rule and the range of graph properties preserved by the same
rule. For some graph properties, collective rationality is easy to achieve, as the
following simple possibility results demonstrate.
Proposition 5. Any unanimous aggregation rule is collectively rational with
respect to reflexivity.
Proof. If every individual graph includes all edges of the form (x, x), then una-
nimity ensures the same for the collective graph.
Proposition 6. Any grounded aggregation rule is collectively rational with re-
spect to irreflexivity.
Proof. If no individual graph includes (x, x), then groundedness ensures the
same for the collective graph.
Proposition 7. Any neutral aggregation rule is collectively rational with respect
to symmetry.
Proof. If edges (x, y) and (y, x) have the same support, then neutrality ensures
that either both or neither will get accepted for the collective graph.
Unfortunately, as we will see next, things do not always work out that harmo-
niously, and certain axiomatic requirements are in conflict with certain collective
rationality requirements.
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3 Impossibility Results
In social choice theory, an impossibility theorem states that it is not possible
to devise an aggregation rule that satisfies certain axioms and that is also col-
lectively rational with respect to a certain combination of properties of the
structures being aggregated (which in our case are graphs). In this section,
we will prove two powerful impossibility theorems for graph aggregation, the
Oligarchy Theorem and the Dictatorship Theorem. The latter identifies a set of
requirements that are impossible to satisfy in the sense that the only aggrega-
tion rules that meet them are the dictatorships. The former drives on somewhat
weaker requirements (specifically, regarding collective rationality) and permits
a somewhat larger—but still decidedly unattractive—set of aggregation rules,
namely the oligarchies.
Our results are inspired by—and significantly generalise—the seminal im-
possibility result for preference aggregation due to Arrow, first published in
1951 [Arrow, 1963]. We recall Arrow’s Theorem in Section 3.1. The following
subsections are devoted to developing the framework in which to present and
then prove our results. Section 3.2 introduces winning coalitions, i.e., sets of
individuals who can force the acceptance or rejection of a given edge, discusses
under what circumstances an aggregation rule can be described in terms of
a family of winning coalitions, and what structural properties of such a fam-
ily correspond to either dictatorial or oligarchic aggregation rules. Sections 3.3
and 3.4 introduce three so-calledmeta-properties for classifying graph properties
and establish fundamental results for these meta-properties. Our impossibility
theorems, which are formulated and proved in Section 3.5, apply to aggrega-
tion rules that are collectively rational with respect to graph properties that are
covered by some of these meta-properties. Section 3.6, finally, discusses several
variants of our theorems and provides a first illustration of their use.
3.1 Background: Arrow’s Theorem for Preference Aggre-
gation
The prime example of an impossibility result is Arrow’s Theorem for preference
aggregation, with preference relations being modelled as weak orders on some
set of alternatives [Arrow, 1963]. We can reformulate Arrow’s Theorem in our
framework for graph aggregation as follows:
For |V | > 3, every unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation rule
that is collectively rational with respect to reflexivity, transitivity,
and completeness must be a dictatorship.
Thus, Arrow’s Theorem applies to the following scenario. We wish to aggregate
the preferences of several agents regarding a set of three or more alternatives.
The agents are assumed to express their preferences by ranking the alternatives
from best to worst (with indifferences being allowed), i.e., by each providing us
with a weak order (a graph that is reflexive, transitive, and complete), and we
want our aggregation rule to compute a single such weak order representing a
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suitable compromise. Furthermore, we want our aggregation rule to respect the
basic axioms of unanimity (if all agents agree that x is at least as good as y,
then the collective preference order should say so), groundedness (if no agent
says that x is at least as good as y, then the collective preference order should
not say so either), and IIE (it should be possible to compute the outcome on an
edge-by-edge basis). Arrow’s Theorem tells us that this is impossible—unless
we are willing to use a dictatorship as our aggregation rule.
This result not only is surprising but also deeply troubling. It therefore is
important to understand to what extent similar phenomena arise in other areas
of graph aggregation. We will revisit Arrow’s Theorem in Section 3.6, where
we will also be in a position to explain why the standard formulation of the
theorem, given in that section as Theorem 18, is indeed implied by the variant
given here.
In the sequel, we will sometimes refer to aggregation rules that are unani-
mous, grounded, and IIE as Arrovian aggregation rules.
3.2 Winning Coalitions, Filters, and Ultrafilters
As is well understood in social choice theory, impossibility theorems in prefer-
ence aggregation heavily feed on independence axioms (in our case IIE). Observe
that an aggregation rule F satisfies IIE if and only if for each edge e ∈ V×V there
exists a set of winning coalitions We ⊆ 2N such that e ∈ F (E) ⇔ NEe ∈ We.
That is, F accepts e if and only if exactly the individuals in one of the winning
coalitions for e do. Imposing additional axioms on F corresponds to restrictions
on the associated family of winning coalitions {We}e∈V×V :
• If F is unanimous, then N ∈ We for any edge e (i.e., the grand coalition
is always a winning coalition).
• If F is grounded, then ∅ 6∈ We for any edge e (i.e., the empty set is not a
winning coalitions).
• If F is monotonic, then C1 ∈ We implies C2 ∈ We for any edge e and any
set C2 ⊃ C1 (i.e., winning coalitions are closed under supersets).
• If F is (NR-)neutral, thenWe =We′ for any two (nonreflexive) edges e and
e′ (i.e., every edge must have exactly the same set of winning coalitions).
Thus, an aggregation rule that is both IIE and neutral can be fully described
in terms of a single set W of winning coalitions. Any such W is a subset of the
powerset of N , the set of individuals. The proofs of our impossibility results will
exploit the special structure of such subsets of the powerset of N , enforced by
both axioms and collective rationality requirements. Specifically, in our proofs
we will encounter the concepts of filters and ultrafilters familiar from model
theory [Davey and Priestley, 2002].
Definition 19. A filter W on a set N is a collection of subsets of N satisfying
the following three conditions:
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(i) ∅ 6∈ W;
(ii) C1, C2 ∈ W implies C1 ∩ C2 ∈ W for any two sets C1, C2 ⊆ N (closure
under intersection);
(iii) C1 ∈ W implies C2 ∈ W for any set C2 ⊆ N with C2 ⊃ C1 (closure under
supersets).
Definition 20. An ultrafilter W on a set N is a collection of subsets of N
satisfying the following three conditions:
(i) ∅ 6∈ W
(ii) C1, C2 ∈ W implies C1 ∩ C2 ∈ W for any two sets C1, C2 ⊆ N (closure
under intersection);
(iii) C or N \C is in W for any set C ⊆ N (maximality).
Every ultrafilter is a filter; in particular, the ultrafilter conditions imply clo-
sure under supersets. Note that the condition ∅ 6∈ W directly corresponds to
groundedness, while closure under supersets corresponds to monotonicity.
The use of ultrafilters in social choice theory goes back to the work of
Fishburn [1970] and Kirman and Sondermann [1972], who employed ultrafil-
ters to prove Arrow’s Theorem and its generalisation to an infinite number of
individuals. The ultrafilter method also has found applications in judgment ag-
gregation [Herzberg and Eckert, 2012], and also filters have been used in both
preference aggregation [Hansson, 1976] and judgment aggregation [Ga¨rdenfors,
2006]. The relevance of filters and ultrafilters to aggregation problems is due to
the following simple results, which interpret well-known facts from model theory
in our specific context.
Lemma 8 (Filter Lemma). Let F be an IIE and NR-neutral aggregation rule
and let W be the corresponding set of winning coalitions for nonreflexive edges,
i.e., (x, y) ∈ F (E) ⇔ NE(x,y) ∈ W for all x 6= y ∈ V . Then F is NR-oligarchic
if and only if W is a filter.
Proof. (⇒) Recall that F being NR-oligarchic means that there exists a
nonempty coalition C⋆ such that a given nonreflexive edge is accepted if and
only if all the agents in C⋆ accept it. Thus, the winning coalitions are exactly
C⋆ and its supersets. This family of sets does not include the empty set and is
closed under both intersection and supersets.
(⇐) Suppose F is determined by the filter W as far as nonreflexive edges
are concerned. Let C⋆ :=
⋂
C∈C C, which is well-defined due to N being finite.
Observe that C⋆ must be nonempty, due to the first two filter conditions. Now
note that F is NR-oligarchic with respect to coalition C⋆.
Lemma 9 (Ultrafilter Lemma). Let F be an IIE and NR-neutral aggregation
rule and let W be the corresponding set of winning coalitions for nonreflexive
edges, i.e., (x, y) ∈ F (E) ⇔ NE(x,y) ∈ W for all x 6= y ∈ V . Then F is
NR-dictatorial if and only if W is an ultrafilter.
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Proof. (⇒) F being NR-dictatorial means that there exists an i⋆ ∈ N such that
the winning coalitions for nonreflexive edges are exactly {i⋆} and its supersets.
This family of sets does not include the empty set, is closed under intersection,
and maximal.
(⇐) Suppose F is determined by the ultrafilter W as far as nonreflexive
edges are concerned. Take an arbitrary C ∈ W with |C| > 2 and consider any
nonempty C′ ( C. By maximality, one of C′ and N \C′ must be in W . Thus,
by closure under intersection, one of C∩C′ = C′ and C ∩ (N \C′) = C \C′ must
be in W as well. Observe that both of these sets are nonempty and of lower
cardinality than C. To summarise, we have just shown for any C ∈ W with
|C| > 2 at least one nonempty proper subset of C is also in W . By maximality,
W is not empty. So take any C ∈ W . Due to N being finite, we can apply
our reduction rule a finite number of times to infer that W must include some
singleton {i⋆} ( · · · ( C. Hence, F is an NR-dictatorship with dictator i⋆.
3.3 The Neutrality Axiom and Contagious Graph Prop-
erties
Recall that the neutrality axiom is required to be able to work with a single
family of winning coalitions as outlined earlier, yet this axiom does not feature
in Arrow’s Theorem. As we shall see soon, the reason we do not need to assume
neutrality is that, in Arrow’s setting, the same restriction on winning coali-
tions is already enforced by collective rationality with respect to transitivity.
This is an interesting link between a specific collective rationality requirement
and a specific axiom. In the literature, this fact is often called the Contagion
Lemma [Sen, 1986], although the connection to neutrality is not usually made
explicit. The same kind of result can also be obtained for other graph properties
with a similar structure. Let us now develop a definition for a class of graph
properties that will allow us to derive neutrality.
Recall that P [S+, S−] denotes the set of graphs with property P that include
all of the edges in S+ and none of those in S−. We start with a technical
definition.
Definition 21. Let x, y, z, w ∈ V . A graph property P ⊆ 2V×V is called
xy/zw-contagious if there exist two disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ V ×V such that
the following conditions hold:
(i) for every graph E ∈ P [S+, S−] it is the case that (x, y) ∈ E implies (z, w) ∈
E; and
(ii) there exist graphs E0, E1 ∈ P [S+, S−] with (z, w) 6∈ E0 and (x, y) ∈ E1.
Part (i) of Definition 21 says that, if you accept edge (x, y), then you must also
accept edge (z, w)—at least if the side condition of you also accepting all the
edges in S+ but none of those in S− is met. That is, the property of xy/zw-
contagiousness may be paraphrased as the formula [
∧
S+ ∧¬
∨
S−]→ [xEy →
zEw]. Part (ii) is a richness condition that says that you have the option of
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z
Figure 1: Illustration of Definition 22, indicating given edges (solid) and implied
edges (dashed).
accepting neither or both of (x, y) and (z, w). It requires the existence of a
graph E0 where neither (x, y) nor (z, w) are accepted, and the existence of a
graph E1 where both (x, y) and (z, w) are accepted.
Contagiousness with respect to two given edges will be useful for our pur-
poses if those two edges stand in a specific relationship to each other. The
following definition captures the relevant cases.
Definition 22. A graph property P ⊆ 2V×V is called contagious if it satisfies
at least one of the three conditions below:
(i) P is xy/yz-contagious for all triples of distinct vertices x, y, z ∈ V .
(ii) P is xy/zx-contagious for all triples of distinct vertices x, y, z ∈ V .
(iii) P is xy/xz-contagious and xy/zy-contagious for all triples of distinct ver-
tices x, y, z ∈ V .
That is, Definition 22 covers pairs of edges where (i) the second edge is a suc-
cessor of the first edge, where (ii) the second edge is a predecessor of the first
edge, and where (iii) the two edges share either a starting point or an end point.
This covers all cases of two edges meeting in one point. The three cases are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. As will become clear in the proof of Lemma 11, case (iii)
differs from the other two, as only one of these two types of connections would
not be sufficient to “traverse” the full graph.
Fact 10. For |V | > 3, the two Euclidean properties, transitivity, negative tran-
sitivity, and connectedness are all contagious graph properties.
Proof. Let us first consider the property of being a right-Euclidean graph. It
satisfies condition (i) of Definition 22. To prove this, we will show that the
right-Euclidean property is xy/yz-contagious for all triples x, y, z ∈ V . Let
S+ = {(x, z)} and S− = ∅, i.e., P [S+, S−] is the set of all right-Euclidean
graphs containing (x, z). Condition (i) of Definition 21 is met: any graph in
P [S+, S−] contains (x, z); therefore, by the right-Euclidean property, (y, z) needs
to be accepted whenever (x, y) is. Condition (ii) is also satisfied. Let E0 be the
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graph only containing the single edge (x, z), and let E1 be the graph containing
exactly the three edges (x, y), (y, z), and (x, z). Both graphs are right-Euclidean
and, since they include (x, z), they also belong to P [S+, S−].
An alternative way of seeing that the right-Euclidean property is contagious
is to observe that it is equivalent to the formula [xEz]→ [xEy → yEz], with all
variables universally quantified. Similarly, the left-Euclidean property, which
can be rewritten as [zEy] → [xEy → zEx], is contagious by condition (ii).
Transitivity satisfies condition (iii), as we can rewrite it either as [yEz] →
[xEy → xEz] or as [zEx] → [xEy → zEy]. Negative transitivity can be
rewritten either as [¬(zEy)] → [xEy → xEz] or as [¬(xEz)] → [xEy → zEy],
and this property thus also satisfies condition (iii). Connectedness, finally, can
be rewritten as [xEz ∧ ¬zEy]→ [xEy → yEz] and thus satisfies condition (i).
For all these properties, the richness conditions are easily verified to hold as
well.
We are now ready to prove a powerful lemma, the Neutrality Lemma, showing
that any Arrovian aggregation rule that is collectively rational with respect to a
contagious graph property must be neutral (at least as far as nonreflexive edges
are concerned). This generalises a result often referred to as the Contagion
Lemma in the literature [Sen, 1986].
Lemma 11 (Neutrality Lemma). For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded, and
IIE aggregation rule that is collectively rational with respect to a contagious
graph property must be NR-neutral.
Proof. We will first establish a generic result for collective rationality with re-
spect to xy/zw-contagiousness. Let x, y, z, w ∈ V . Take any graph property P
that is xy/zw-contagious and take any aggregation rule F that is unanimous,
grounded, IIE, and collectively rational with respect to P . Let {We}e∈V×V
be the family of winning coalitions associated with F . We want to show that
W(x,y) ⊆ W(z,w). So let C be a coalition in W(x,y). Let S
+, S− ⊆ V ×V and
E0, E1 ∈ P [S+, S−] be defined as in Definition 21. Consider a profile E in
which the individuals in C propose graph E1 and all others propose E0. That
is, all individuals accept the edges in S+, none accept any of those in S−, ex-
actly the individuals in C accept edge (x, y), and exactly those in C also accept
(z, w). Now consider the collective graph F (E). By unanimity S+ ⊆ F (E),
by groundedness S− ∩ F (E) = ∅, and finally (x, y) ∈ F (E) due to C being a
winning coalition for (x, y). By collective rationality, F (E) ∈ P and thus also
F (E) ∈ P [S+, S−]. But then, due to xy/zw-contagiousness of F (E), we get
(z, w) ∈ F (E). As it was exactly the individuals in C who accepted (z, w),
coalition C must be winning for (z, w), i.e., C ∈ W(z,w), and we are done.
We are now ready to prove the lemma. Take any graph property P that is
contagious and take any aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, IIE,
and collectively rational with respect to P . Let {We}e∈V×V be the family of
winning coalitions associated with F . We need to show that there exists a unique
W ⊆ 2N such that W = We for every nonreflexive edge e. By unanimity, the
sets We are not empty (because at least N ∈ We). Consider any three vertices
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Figure 2: Collective rationality with respect to the right-Euclidean property
implies neutrality.
x, y, z ∈ V and any coalition C ∈ W(x,y). We will show that C is also winning
for both (y, z) and (y, x). If we can show this for any x, y, z, then we are done,
as we can then repeat the same method several times until all nonreflexive edges
are covered.
For each of the three possible ways in which P can be contagious (see
Definition 22), we will use different instances of our generic result for xy/zw-
contagiousness above:
• First, if P is contagious by virtue of condition (i), then we can use xy/yz-
contagiousness to get C ∈ W(y,z) and its instance xy/yx-contagiousness
(with z := x) to obtain also C ∈ W(y,x).
• Second, if P is contagious due to condition (ii), we use xy/yx-
contagiousness to get C ∈ W(y,x), and then yx/zy-contagiousness to get
C ∈ W(z,y) and zy/yz-contagiousness to get C ∈ W(y,z).
• Third, suppose P is contagious by virtue of condition (iii). We first use
xy/zy-contagiousness to obtain C ∈ W(z,y) and then zy/zx-contagiousness
to get C ∈ W(z,x). From the latter, via zx/yx-contagiousness we get
C ∈ W(y,x). Finally, yx/yz-contagiousness then entails C ∈ W(y,z).
Hence, we obtain the required transfer from one edge (x, y) to both its successor
(y, z) and its inverse (y, x) in all three cases, and our proof is complete.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of a specific instance of the main argument in
the proof of Lemma 11 when the right-Euclidean property is considered, which
is xy/yz-contagious by Fact 10. We have S+ = {(x, z)} and S− = ∅. E1 is
the graph that accepts all three edges (x, y), (y, z) and (x, z), and E0 accepts
only edge (x, z). Consider profile E, in which the individuals in C choose E1
and all others choose E0. That is, the individuals in C accept (x, y) and (y, z),
while (x, z) is accepted by all individuals in N . By unanimity, (x, z) must be
accepted, and due to C ∈ W(x,y) also (x, y) should be accepted. We can now
conclude, since F is collectively rational with respect to the right-Euclidean
property, that (y, z) should also be accepted, and hence that C ∈ W(y,z). It is
then sufficient to consider all triples to obtain neutrality over all (nonreflexive)
edges.
23
3.4 Implicative and Disjunctive Graph Properties
Let us briefly recapitulate where we are at this point. We now know that any
Arrovian aggregation rule F that is collectively rational with respect to some
contagious graph property P can be fully described in terms of a single familyW
of winning coalitions, at least as far as F ’s behaviour on nonreflexive edges is
concerned. To prove our impossibility results, we will need to derive structural
properties of W that allow us to infer that W is either a filter or an ultrafilter
(so we can use Lemma 8 or 9, respectively). These structural properties will be
shown to follow from collective rationality requirements with respect to graph
properties belonging to a certain class of such properties.
We will now introduce two such classes of graph properties, or “meta-
properties” as we shall also call them. Recall that we have already seen one
meta-property, namely contagiousness (which, however, is much more complex
than the following meta-properties). First, a graph property is implicative if
the inclusion of some edges can force the inclusion of a further edge, as is the
case, for instance, for transitivity. The following definition makes this precise.
Definition 23. A graph property P ⊆ 2V×V is called implicative if there
exist two disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ V ×V and three distinct edges e1, e2, e3 ∈
V ×V \ (S+ ∪ S−) such that the following conditions hold:
(i) for every graph E ∈ P [S+, S−] it is the case that e1, e2 ∈ E implies e3 ∈ E;
and
(ii) there exist graphs E0, E1, E2, E13, E123 ∈ P [S
+, S−] with E0∩{e1, e2, e3} =
∅, E1 ∩ {e1, e2, e3} = {e1}, E2 ∩ {e1, e2, e3} = {e2}, E13 ∩ {e1, e2, e3} =
{e1, e3}, and {e1, e2, e3} ⊆ E123.
Part (i) expresses that all graphs with property P (that also include all edges
in S+ and none from S−) must satisfy the formula e1 ∧ e2 → e3. Part (ii)
is a richness condition saying that accepting/rejecting any combination of e1
and e2 is possible, that e3 need not be accepted unless both e1 and e2 are,
and that e3 can be accepted even if only the first antecedent e1 is.
5 Observe
that Definition 23 has an existential form, i.e., we simply need to find two
subsets S+ and S− for the precondition, and three edges e1, e2 and e3 that
satisfy the two requirements (i) and (ii). In this sense, implicativeness is much
less demanding than contagiousness, which imposes conditions across the entire
graph. Implicativeness may be paraphrased as the formula [
∧
S+ ∧ ¬
∨
S−]→
[e1 ∧ e2 → e3].
Fact 12. For |V | > 3, the two Euclidean properties, transitivity, and connect-
edness are all implicative graph properties.
Proof (sketch). Let V = {v1, v2, v3, . . .}. To see that transitivity satisfies Defi-
nition 23, choose S+ = S− = ∅, e1 = (v1, v2), e2 = (v2, v3), and e3 = (v1, v3).
5In our earlier work, we did not require the existence of E13 [Endriss and Grandi, 2014b].
The slightly stronger formulation used here is necessary to prove one of our general impossi-
bility theorems (Theorem 14), but not the other (Theorem 15).
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Transitivity implies that, if both e1 and e2 are accepted, then also e3 should
be accepted. All remaining acceptance/rejection patterns of e1, e2, and e3 are
possible, in accordance with condition (ii). The proofs for the Euclidean prop-
erties are similar. Rewriting connectedness as [¬yEz]→ [(xEy ∧ xEz)→ zEy]
shows that it is implicative as well.
Note that implicativeness is a very weak requirement: even transitivity re-
stricted to a single triple of edges is sufficient to satisfy it. Next, we define
disjunctive graph properties as properties that force us to include at least one
of two given edges, as is the case, for instance, for completeness.
Definition 24. A graph property P ⊆ 2V×V is called disjunctive if there exist
two disjoint sets S+, S− ⊆ V×V and two distinct edges e1, e2 ∈ V×V \(S+∪S−)
such that the following conditions hold:
(i) for every graph E ∈ P [S+, S−] we have e1 ∈ E or e2 ∈ E; and
(ii) there exist two graphs E1, E2 ∈ P [S+, S−] with E1 ∩ {e1, e2} = {e1} and
E2 ∩ {e1, e2} = {e2}.
Part (i) ensures that all graphs with property P (that meet the precondition
of including all edges in S+ and none from S−) satisfy the formula e1 ∨ e2.
Part (ii) is a richness condition ensuring that there are at least two graphs that
each include only one of e1 and e2. Definition 24 also has an existential form,
and it may be paraphrased as the formula [
∧
S+ ∧ ¬
∨
S−]→ [e1 ∨ e2].
Fact 13. For |V | > 3, negative transitivity, connectedness, completeness, non-
triviality, and seriality are all disjunctive graph properties.
Proof. Let V = {v1, . . . , vm}. For negative transitivity, choose S+ = {v1, v2},
S− = ∅, e1 = (v1, v3), and e2 = (v3, v2) to see that the conditions are satisfied.
For connectedness, choose S+ = {(v1, v2), (v1, v3)}, S− = ∅, e1 = (v2, v3), and
e2 = (v3, v2). For completeness, choose S
+ = S− = ∅, e1 = (v1, v2), and
e2 = (v2, v1). For nontriviality, choose S
+ = ∅, S− = {(vi, vj) : {i, j} 6= {1, 2}},
e1 = (v1, v2), and e2 = (v2, v1). Finally, for seriality, choose S
+ = ∅, S− =
{(v1, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (v1, vm−2)}, e1 = (v1, vm−1), and e2 = (v1, vm).
Note that some of these results could be strengthened to the case of |V | = 2,
but doing so would not be useful for our purposes here.
3.5 Two General Impossibility Theorems for Graph Ag-
gregation
We are now ready to present our impossibility results. We will prove two main
theorems. What they have in common is that they talk about Arrovian aggre-
gation rules F that are collectively rational with respect to a graph property P
that is contagious and implicative. For the first theorem, we will show that un-
der these assumptions F must be oligarchic (at least as far as nonreflexive edges
are concerned). For the second theorem, we also assume that P is disjunctive,
and show that then F must be dictatorial (at least on nonreflexive edges).
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Theorem 14 (Oligarchy Theorem). For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded,
and IIE aggregation rule F that is collectively rational with respect to a graph
property P that is contagious and implicative must be oligarchic on nonreflexive
edges.
Proof. Take any graph property P that is contagious and implicative, and any
aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, IIE, and collectively rational
with respect to P . By Lemma 11, F must be NR-neutral. Hence, there exists a
set of winning coalitions W ⊆ 2N determining F in the sense that e ∈ F (E)⇔
NEe ∈ W for any nonreflexive edge e.
We shall prove thatW is a filter (see Definition 19), from which the theorem
then follows by Lemma 8. Condition (i) holds, as F is grounded. So we still need
to show that W satisfies condition (ii), i.e., that it is closed under intersection,
and condition (iii), i.e., that it is closed under supersets. To do so, we will
make use of the assumption that P is implicative. Let S+, S− ⊆ V ×V and
e1, e2, e3 ∈ V ×V ; and let E0, E1, E2, E13, E123 ∈ P [S+, S−] be defined as in
Definition 23.
First, take any two winning coalitions C1, C2 ∈ W . Consider a profile of
graphs E satisfying P in which exactly the individuals in C1∩C2 propose E123,
those in C1 \C2 propose E1, those in C2 \C1 propose E2, and all others propose
E0. Thus, exactly the individuals in C1 accept e1, exactly those in C2 accept
e2, and exactly those in C1 ∩C2 accept e3. Furthermore, all individuals accept
S+ and all of them reject S−. Hence, due to unanimity, all edges in S+ must
be part of the collective graph F (E), while due to groundedness, none of the
edges in S− can be part of F (E). As F is collectively rational with respect to
P , we get F (E) ∈ P [S+, S−]. Now, since C1 and C2 are winning coalitions, e1
and e2 must be part of F (E). As P is implicative, this means that e3 ∈ F (E).
Hence, we must have C1 ∩ C2 ∈ W , i.e., W is closed under intersection.
Now, take any winning coalition C1 ∈ W and any other coalition C2 with
C1 ⊆ C2. Consider a profile of graphs E satisfying P in which the individuals in
C1 propose E123, those in C2 \C1 propose E13, and those in N \C2 propose E1.
In other words, the coalition of supporters of e1 is N , the coalition of supporters
of e2 is C1, the coalition of supporters of e3 is C2, all individuals accept S
+, and
all of them also reject S−. Due to unanimity and as C1 ∈ W , e1 and e2 will be
part of the collective graph F (E). As F is collectively rational with respect to
P , we thus also get e3 ∈ F (E). Hence, as e3 was supported by C2, it must be
the case that C2 ∈ W , i.e., W is closed under supersets.
If the graph property to be preserved under aggregation also is required to
be disjunctive, we can further tighten this impossibility result and obtain a
dictatorship. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 14, the only added
difficulty being that of proving maximality of the filter from collective rationality
with respect to a disjunctive graph property.
Theorem 15 (Dictatorship Theorem). For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded,
and IIE aggregation rule F that is collectively rational with respect to a graph
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Figure 3: Using collective rationality with respect to transitvity and complete-
ness.
property P that is contagious, implicative, and disjunctive must be dictatorial
on nonreflexive edges.
Proof. Take any graph property P that is contagious, implicative, and disjunc-
tive, and any aggregation rule F that is unanimous, grounded, and IIE, and
collectively rational with respect to P . By Lemma 11, F must be NR-neutral,
i.e., on nonreflexive edges, F must be determined by a single family W of win-
ning coalitions. We shall prove that the W is an ultrafilter (see Definition 20),
from which the theorem then follows by Lemma 9. Condition (i) holds, as F is
grounded. Condition (ii) follows from P being implicative and can be proved
exactly as for Theorem 14.
To derive condition (iii), we will make use of the assumption that P is
disjunctive. Let S+, S− ⊆ V ×V and e1, e2 ∈ V ×V ; and let E1, E2 ∈ P [S+, S−]
be defined as in Definition 24. Now take any winning coalition C ∈ W . Consider
a profile E satisfying P in which exactly the individuals in C propose E1 and
exactly those in N \C propose E2. Recall that S+ ⊆ E1 and S+ ⊆ E2, i.e., all
individuals accept S+. Thus, due to unanimity, all of the edges in S+ must be
part of the collective graph F (E). Analogously, due to groundedness, none of
the edges in S− can be part of F (E). Thus, as F is collectively rational with
respect to P , we get F (E) ∈ P [S+, S−]. As P is disjunctive, this means that
one of e1 and e2 has to be part of F (E). Hence, C ∈ W or (N \C) ∈ W .
It may be helpful to illustrate the main arguments in the proofs of Theorem 14
and 15 by instantiating them for specific graph properties rather than generic
meta-properties. For instance, we can derive closure of intersection of W by
using collective rationality with respect to transitivity, which by Fact 12 is an
implicative property. Consider the profile depicted on the left in Figure 3, in
which exactly the individuals in C1 accept edge e1 = (x, y), exactly those in C2
accept e2 = (y, z), and exactly those in C1 ∩ C2 accept e3 = (x, z). As both
C1 and C2 are winning coalitions, we obtain that both (x, y) and (y, z) need to
be collectively accepted. We can now conclude, since F is collectively rational
with respect to transitivity, that the edge (x, z) should also be accepted. Hence,
the coalition accepting (x, z), which is C1 ∩ C2, must be a winning coalition as
well. Similarly, we can obtain closure under supersets from collective rationality
with respect to transitivity using the profile shown in the middle of Figure 3.
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Here, all individuals accept e1 = (x, y), those in C1 accept e2 = (y, z), and those
in C2, which is a superset of C1, accept e3 = (x, z). As both N and C1 are
winning coalitions, both (x, y) and (y, z) get accepted. Thus, as F is collectively
rational with respect to transitivity, so does (x, z). Hence, C2, the coalition of
supportes of (x, z), must also be winning. Finally, we can prove maximality of
W by using collective rationality with respect to, say, completeness, which by
Fact 13 is a disjunctive property. Consider the profile on the righthand side of
Figure 3, in which exactly the individuals in C accept e1 = (x, y) and exactly
those in N \C accept e2 = (y, x). As F is collectively rational with respect to
completeness, one of the two edges has to get accepted in the outcome, i.e., one
of the two coalitions accepting these two edges must be winning, meaning that
either C ∈ W or (N \C) ∈ W .
Observe that the converse of Theorem 15 holds as well: any dictatorship is
unanimous, grounded, IIE, and collectively rational with respect to any graph
property (and certainly with respect to those that are contagious, implicative,
and disjunctive).6 Thus, an alternative reading of Theorem 15 is as that of a
family of characterisation theorems of the dictatorships (with one characterisa-
tion for every P that is contagious and implicative).
Our Theorem 15 is related to generalisations of Arrow’s Theorem to judg-
ment aggregation [Dietrich and List, 2007b, Dokow and Holzman, 2010], par-
ticularly in the formulation due to Dokow and Holzman [2010], who model sets
of judgments (on m issues) as binary vectors in some subspace of {0, 1}m. It
is possible to embed graph aggregation into this form of judgment aggrega-
tion, by adapting the well-known approach for embedding preference aggrega-
tion into judgment aggregation [Dietrich and List, 2007b, Dokow and Holzman,
2010, Grandi and Endriss, 2013]. This suggests that it should also be possible to
derive Theorem 15 as a special case of the main result of Dokow and Holzman,
which would involve showing that graph properties that are contagious, implica-
tive, and disjunctive can be mapped into subspaces of {0, 1}m (with m = |V×V |)
that, in the terminology of Dokow and Holzman, are totally blocked and not
affine.7 While we conjecture this to be possible in principle, we also conjecture
6The same is not true for Theorem 14: it is not the case that every oligarchy is collec-
tively rational with respect to every contagious and implicative graph property. The reason
is that not every contagious and implicative graph property is closed under intersection, al-
though many concrete such properties (e.g., transitivity) are. For example, the intersection
rule does not preserve connectedness (which we have seen to be both contagious and implica-
tive): if agent 1 provides the connected graph {(x, y), (x, z), (y, z)} and agent 2 provides the
connected graph {(x, y), (x, z), (z, y)}, then their intersection {(x, y), (x, z)} nevertheless fails
to be connected.
7Note that both Dokow and Holzman [2010] and Dietrich and List [2007b] in fact prove
characterisation results (in a different sense of that word than we have used in Section 2.4)
that have both an impossibility and a possibility component. To use our terminology, they
formulate meta-properties that are such that, whenever they are met, then nondictatorial
aggregation is impossible, while whenever they are not met, nondictatorial aggregation is
possible. We do not consider this second direction here. The reason is that, rather than
proving theorems of maximal logical strength, we are interested in theorems that are easy
to apply. That this is the case for our choice of meta-properties will be demonstrated in
Section 5.
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any such proof to be at least as technically involved as our proof given here
and certainly much less valuable from a “didactic” point of view. Indeed, our
proof arguably is easier and clearer than both the proofs for the correspond-
ing result in the more specific domain of preference aggregation (i.e., Arrow’s
Theorem)8 and the proofs for the corresponding results in the more general do-
main of judgment aggregation (i.e., the result of of Dokow and Holzman [2010]
and its variant due to Dietrich and List [2007b]). The reason is that our meta-
properties encode directly what we require in the proof steps where they are
used.
3.6 Variants and Instances of the General Impossibility
Theorems
In the remainder of this section, we shall briefly discuss the implications of of our
general impossibility theorems for specific classes of graphs, particularly those
that satisfy some of the properties of Table 1. We keep this discussion largely
abstract; concrete applications will be discussed in Section 5. But first let us
consider a number of variants of our theorems and mention additional assump-
tions that would allow us to remove the technical constraint on nonreflexive
edges in Theorems 14 and 15, and to instead derive results on full dictatorships
and full oligarchies, respectively.
First, note that if we remove the requirement of P being contagious but
add the assumption of F being NR-neutral to Theorems 14 and 15, we can still
derive the same conclusions (namely, F being NR-oligarchic or NR-dictatorial,
respectively). If we impose full neutrality rather than just NR-neutrality, these
conclusions can be strengthened to F being fully oligarchic or dictatorial, re-
spectively. For ease of reference, we state these variants here explicitly:
Theorem 16. For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded, IIE, and (NR-)neutral
aggregation rule F that is collectively rational with respect to a graph property P
that is implicative must be (NR-)oligarchic.
Theorem 17. For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded, IIE, and (NR-)neutral
aggregation rule F that is collectively rational with respect to a graph property P
that is implicative and disjunctive must be (NR-)dictatorial.
As implicativeness and disjunctiveness are much less demanding properties than
contagiousness and as neutrality is often a reasonable axiom to impose, these
variants of our main theorems are of some practical interest.
Next, recall that by Proposition 5, unanimity implies collective rationality
with respect to reflexivity. Thus, our theorems remain true if we add reflexivity
to the collective rationality requirements. In fact, they can be strengthened: for
8This is true for proofs of Arrow’s Theorem using the ultrafilter method, which is a refine-
ment of the “decisive coalition method” going back to Arrow’s original work [Arrow, 1963].
There are, however, other proofs available that exploit the specific structure of preferences,
and thus do not generalise to, e.g., judgment aggregation, which some readers will find more
accessible [Geanakoplos, 2005].
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a unanimous rule and under the assumption that all input graphs are reflexive,
every NR-dictatorial rule is in fact a full dictatorship and any NR-oligarchic
rule is in fact a full oligarchy. Analogously, by Proposition 6 and in view of
our assumption of groundedness, we can alternatively add irreflexivity to the
collective rationality requirements and strengthen our theorems in the same
manner. Thus, we obtain two further variants each for each of Theorem 15 and
Theorem 14.
A simple instance of the first of these variants of Theorem 15 is Arrow’s
Theorem for weak orders (i.e., binary relations that are reflexive, transitive,
and complete). An aggregation rule mapping profiles of weak orders to weak
orders, i.e., a social welfare function [Arrow, 1963], is simply a graph aggre-
gation rule that is collectively rational with respect to reflexivity, transitivity,
and completeness. Arrow uses two axioms, namely independence (which is the
same as our IIE axiom), and the weak Pareto condition, according to which
unanimously held strict preferences between two alternatives x and y should be
respected by the aggregation rule.
Theorem 18 (Arrow, 1963). Any weakly Paretian and independent preference
aggregation rule, mapping profiles of weak orders over three or more alternatives
to weak orders, must be a dictatorship.
Proof. If we use the edges of a graph to represent weak preferences, then strict
preference of x over y means that we accept edge (x, y) but reject edge (y, x).
Thus, the weak Pareto condition together with IIE (independence) implies una-
nimity, while the weak Pareto condition together with collective rationality with
respect to completeness implies groundedness.
Now the theorem follows immediately from Theorem 15, together with the
insights that (i) transitivity is a graph property that is contagious (Fact 10)
and implicative (Fact 12), that (ii) completeness is a graph property that is
disjunctive (Fact 13), and that (iii) reflexivity allows us to conclude that the
aggregation rule must be a full dictatorship rather than just an NR-dictatorial
rule.
Using the same approach, we can also easily derive a variant of Arrow’s The-
orem for strict linear preference orders (binary relations that are irreflexive,
transitive, and complete) from Theorem 15. In this context, the weak Pareto
condition is equivalent to the unanimity axiom, and groundedness is implied by
the weak Pareto condition together with the collective rationality requirement
for completeness.
But Arrow’s Theorem now is just an example. We can immediately obtain
any number of impossibility results such as this one, as long as the properties
of the graphs we want to work with hit the appropriate meta-properties. Ta-
ble 2 summarises which of our standard graph properties are contagious (see
Fact 10), implicative (see Fact 12), and disjunctive (see Fact 13), respectively.
Any combination of graph properties that together hit all three graph properties,
by Theorem 15, gives rise to an impossibility theorem saying that all relevant
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Property Contagious? Implicative? Disjunctive?
Reflexivity × × ×
Irreflexivity × × ×
Symmetry × × ×
Antisymmetry × × ×
Right Euclidean X X ×
Left Euclidean X X ×
Transitivity X X ×
Negative Transitivity X × X
Connectedness X X X
Completeness × × X
Nontriviality × × X
Seriality × × X
Table 2: Meta-properties of common graph properties.
aggregation rules are NR-dictatorial. Similarly, any combination of graph prop-
erties that together hit the first two meta-properties, by Theorem 14, gives rise
to an impossibility theorem saying that the only relevant aggregation rules are
NR-oligarchic. To be precise, when combining several graph properties, one
needs to verify that the relevant richness conditions continue to be satisfied
(which is trivially the case for all combinations of properties considered in Ta-
ble 2). To exemplify the possibilities, we state two concrete instances of our
general results explicitly. They are particularly interesting, because they each
require collective rationality with respect to just a single graph-property.
Corollary 19. For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation
rule that is collectively rational with respect to transitivity must be oligarchic on
nonreflexive edges.
Corollary 20. For |V | > 3, any unanimous, grounded, and IIE aggregation
rule that is collectively rational with respect to connectedness must be dictatorial
on nonreflexive edges.
4 Integrity Constraints in Modal Logic
So far we have worked with a definition of collective rationality that applies
to every possible graph property (and we have specifically focused on common
properties, such as transitivity). An alternative approach is to limit attention to
properties that can be expressed in a restricted (logical) language. This is useful
when we are interested in algorithmic aspects of collective rationality, e.g., the
complexity of checking whether a given model satisfies the constraint (model
checking). In our previous work on binary aggregation [Grandi and Endriss,
2013], we have focused on properties expressible in the language of propositional
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logic. Here, instead, we focus on fundamental properties of graphs that can be
expressed using the language of modal logic [Blackburn et al., 2001].
As we shall see, this is interesting not only because modal logic is a widely
used language for describing graphs, but also because the standard semantics of
modal logic suggests a new distinction of different levels of collective rationality.
After a brief review of relevant concepts from modal logic in Section 4.1, we
introduce these three levels in Section 4.2. One of them operates at the level
of frames, one at the level of models, and one at the levels of possible worlds.
The first is equivalent to the basic notion of collective rationality used in the
first part of this paper. Results for the other two are presented in Section 4.3
and 4.4, respectively.
4.1 Background: Modal Logic
In what follows, we briefly review the basic concepts of modal logic and introduce
the relevant notation [Blackburn et al., 2001]. Fix a finite set Φ of propositional
variables. The set of well-formed formulas ϕ is defined as follows (with p ranging
over the elements of Φ):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ | ♦ϕ
A (Kripke) model M = 〈G,Val 〉 consists of a graph G = 〈V,E〉 and a valuation
function Val : Φ → 2V . In line with standard terminology, we also refer to
G as a (Kripke) frame, to V as the set of possible worlds, and to E as an
accessibility relation. The valuation Val is mapping propositional variables p to
sets of possible worlds—the worlds where the p in question is true. The truth
of an arbitrary formula ϕ at a world x ∈ V in a model M = 〈G,Val 〉, denoted
M,x |= ϕ, is defined recursively:
• M,x |= p if x ∈ Val(p) for any p ∈ Φ
• M,x |= ¬ϕ if M,x 6|= ϕ
• M,x |= ϕ ∧ ψ if M,x |= ϕ and M,x |= ψ
• M,x |= ♦ϕ if M, y |= ϕ for some y ∈ E(x)
Furthermore, A∨B is short for ¬(¬A∧¬B), A→ B is short for ¬(A∧¬B), and
A is short for ¬♦¬A. Besides this notion of truth of ϕ at a given world, the
semantics of modal logic provides two further ways of interpreting a formula ϕ
on a graph G. First, a formula ϕ is globally true in model M = 〈G,Val 〉,
denoted M |= ϕ, if M,x |= ϕ for every x ∈ V . Second, ϕ is valid on frame G,
denoted G |= ϕ, if 〈G,Val 〉 |= ϕ for every valuation Val. Two formulas ϕ and ψ
are equivalent if M,x |= ϕ implies M,x |= ψ and vice versa, for every model M
and every world x.
Example 10 (Frame validity and global truth). Consider the frame G = 〈V,E〉,
with V = {x, y, z, w}, shown in Figure 4. An example for a formula that is valid
in this frame is q → q, because—whatever the model—in every world for
which all accessible worlds satisfy q also all worlds accessible in exactly two steps
satisfy q. The formula p → ♦p, on the other hand, is not valid in G, because
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Figure 4: Example for a modal logic frame with four possible worlds.
Property Modal Formula
Reflexivity p→ ♦p
Symmetry p→ ♦p
Right Euclidean ♦p→ ♦p
Transitivity ♦♦p→ ♦p
Connectedness (p→ q) ∨(q → p)
Seriality ♦(p ∨ ¬p)
Table 3: Common frame properties and the corresponding modal formulas.
there exist models based on G, e.g., the model with Val(p) = {z}, in which it is
not the case that from every world in which p is true we can access some world
that also satisfies p. However, p→ ♦p is globally true in some models based on
G, e.g., in the model with Val(p) = ∅.
Recall that both truth at a world and global truth in a model are concepts
that require the introduction of a valuation Val. Validity on a frame, on the
other hand, is independent of the valuation and can be used to express global
properties of frames, i.e., of graphs alone. For instance, it is well-known that
G = 〈V,E〉 is reflexive (i.e., E is a reflexive relation on V ) if and only if the
formula p→ ♦p is valid on G. Results of this kind belong to the realm of modal
correspondence theory [van Benthem, 2001]. That is, through the concept of
validity on a frame, we are able to express a property of a graph by means of a
formula in modal logic.
Some of the most fundamental frame properties considered in correspondence
theory are listed in Table 3. Such formulas can also be combined to characterise
classes of graphs of interest. An equivalence relation, for instance, is a frame
on which p→ ♦p, p→ ♦p, and ♦♦p → ♦p are valid. Note that not all graph
properties have modal formulas defining them (e.g., irreflexivity, completeness,
and negative transitivity do not).9
9The left-Euclidean property defined in Table 1 also cannot be expressed directly. It
corresponds to the formula for the right-Euclidean property interpreted on the inverse relation
E−1.
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4.2 Three Levels of Collective Rationality
Given a set of propositional variables Φ, we shall refer to modal formulas ϕ
constructed from Φ as modal integrity constraints. We now introduce three
definitions of collective rationality with respect to a modal integrity constraint.
What distinguishes them is the level (frame, model, world) at which the modal
integrity constraint is interpreted.
Definition 25. An aggregation rule F is frame collectively rational with
respect to a modal integrity constraint ϕ if 〈V,Ei〉 |= ϕ for all i ∈ N implies
〈V, F (E)〉 |= ϕ.
That is, F is frame collectively rational with respect to ϕ if validity of ϕ on all
individual frames 〈V,Ei〉 implies validity of ϕ on the collective frame 〈V, F (E)〉.
This is equivalent to our original Definition 18, with the only difference being
that the property with respect to which we require collective rationality now
has to be expressed by means of a modal formula.
Definition 26. An aggregation rule F is model collectively rational with
respect to a modal integrity constraint ϕ if for every valuation Val : Φ→ 2V we
have 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉 |= ϕ for all i ∈ N implying 〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉 |= ϕ.
That is, F is model collectively rational with respect to ϕ if—for any valuation
Val—global truth of ϕ in all individual models 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉 implies global truth
of ϕ in the collective model 〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉.
Definition 27. An aggregation rule F is world collectively rational with
respect to a modal integrity constraint ϕ if for every valuation Val : Φ → 2V
and every world x ∈ V we have 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ for all i ∈ N implying
〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ.
Thus, F is world collectively rational with respect to ϕ if—again, for any
valuation—truth of ϕ at a given world in all individual models implies truth
of ϕ at the same world in the collective model.
Example 11 (Levels of collective rationality). Let us go back to our Example 8,
in which aggregating three graphs that are serial by means of the majority rule
yielded a fourth graph that fails to be serial. Specifically, in the majority graph
the world w does not have a successor. In our discussion of Example 8, we
concluded that the majority rule is not collectively rational with respect to seri-
ality, which in the terminology of Definition 25 is expressed as the majority rule
not being frame collectively rational with respect to ♦(p ∨ ¬p), a modal formula
that corresponds to seriality. On the other hand, by Fact 4, the majority rule is
frame collectively rational with respect to p → ♦p, corresponding to reflexivity.
But note that the majority rule is not model collectively rational with respect to
the same formula p → ♦p. To see this, consider a model with a valuation Val
such that p is true at every world. Then p → ♦p is globally true in all individ-
ual models, but it is not globally true in the collective model, since the bottom
world w is not connected to any of the other p-worlds (i.e., p is true at w, but
♦p is not).
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A straightforward analysis of Definitions 25–27 yields the following result:
Proposition 21. Let F be an aggregation rule and let ϕ be a modal integrity
constraint. Then the following implications hold:
(i) If F is world collectively rational with respect to ϕ, then F is also model
collectively rational with respect to ϕ.
(ii) If F is model collectively rational with respect to ϕ, then F is also frame
collectively rational with respect to ϕ.
These inclusions are strict. For example, the aggregation rule F that returns the
full graph in case all individual graphs satisfy ♦(p ∨ ¬p), and the empty graph
otherwise, is model collectively rational but not world collectively rational. To
see this, consider a profile of graphs with two worlds where Ei = {(x, y)} for
all i ∈ N . The outcome returned by F is the empty graph, in violation of
world collective rationality with respect to ♦(p ∨ ¬p) at world x. Moreover,
Example 11 can be used to show the strict implication in item (ii), since it
concerns an aggregation rule that is frame collectively rational with respect to
modal formula p → ♦p but not model collectively rational with respect to the
same formula.
Thus, frame collective rationality is the least demanding of our three notions
of collective rationality and world collective rationality is the most demanding.
Hence, negative results are strongest when formulated for frame collective ratio-
nality, while positive results are strongest when formulated for world collective
rationality. Our (negative) impossibility results of Section 3 were indeed proved
for frame collective rationality and these results thus immediately extend also
to the other two levels (in those cases where the graph property in question
has a corresponding modal formula). The (positive) possibility results for frame
collective rationality of Section 2.5, however, do not automatically transfer. In-
deed, as we will see next, they cannot be extended even to the next level, namely
that of model collective rationality. Following this, we will complete the pic-
ture by establishing a number of positive results for world collective rationality,
which immediately transfer to the other two levels as well.
4.3 Limitative Results for Collective Rationality at the
Level of Models
Recall that in Section 2.5 we have seen that every unanimous aggregation rule
is collectively rational with respect to reflexivity (Proposition 5) and every neu-
tral aggregation rule is collectively rational with respect to symmetry (Proposi-
tion 7). Given the well-known results in modal correspondence theory for these
two properties, which we recall in Table 3, we can reformulate these results as
follows:10
10Note that Proposition 6 cannot be reformulated in an analogous manner, because irreflex-
ivity cannot be expressed in terms of a modal formula.
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• Any unanimous aggregation rule is frame collectively rational with respect
to p→ ♦p.
• Any neutral aggregation rule is frame collectively rational with respect to
p→ ♦p.
The following two examples show that these results are tight, in the sense that
they cease to hold when we replace frame collective rationality by model col-
lective rationality. Both examples use the intersection rule F∩, which is both
unanimous and neutral.
Example 12 (Counterexample for p → ♦p). Let V = {x, y}. Suppose
two individuals provide the following two graphs: E1 = {(x, y), (y, y)} and
E2 = {(y, x), (x, x)}, i.e., F∩ will return the empty graph. Now consider
the three models we obtain for these three graphs when we use the valuation
Val(p) = {x, y}, which makes p true at every world. Then the formula p → ♦p
is globally true in the two individual models, but it is not globally true in the
model based on the collective (empty) graph. Hence, the intersection rule, de-
spite being unanimous, is not model collectively rational with respect to p→ ♦p.
Example 13 (Counterexample for p → ♦p). Let V = {x, y, z}. Suppose
two individuals report the graphs E1 = {(x, y), (y, z)} and E2 = {(x, y), (y, x)},
respectively. If we aggregate using F∩, we obtain a collective graph with a single
edge (x, y). Now consider the valuation Val(p) = {x, z}. While the formula
p → ♦p is globally true in both individual models, the same formula is not
satisfied at x in the collective model (while p is true at x, x is connected in
the collective graph to y at which ♦p is not satisfied). Hence, despite being
neutral, F∩ is not model collectively rational with respect to the modal formula
corresponding to symmetry.
For more demanding modal integrity constraints, the situation is even more
bleak. For example, we have already seen that transitivity is not preserved
under the majority rule, which is an aggregation rule that meets essentially
all axioms of interest. This is precisely what the Condorcet paradox shows
(see Example 9). Thus, neither unanimity nor neutrality (nor any other basic
axiom we have considered) could possibly guarantee an aggregation rule to be
frame collectively rational, or indeed model collectively rational, with respect
to ♦♦p → ♦p, the modal formula corresponding to transitivity. The best we
can say is that all oligarchic rules are frame collectively rational with respect
to ♦♦p → ♦p. This is so, because the intersection of several transitive graphs
is always transitive itself. We conclude our discussion of limitative results with
an example showing that even this basic result does not transfer to collective
rationality at the level of models.
Example 14 (Counterexample for ♦♦p → ♦p). Let V = {x, y, z, w} and sup-
pose two individuals submit the two graphs depicted to the left of the dashed line
below:
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Under a valuation with Val(p) = {x, z, w}, the formula ♦♦p → ♦p is globally
true in both models: world w is the only world where ♦♦p is true, and in both
models w also satisfies ♦p. Now, the intersection rule will return the graph
shown to the right of the dashed line. In the corresponding model, the antecedent
♦♦p is still true at w, but ♦p is not, since p is false at y. Hence, the intersection
rule is not model collectively rational with respect to ♦♦p→ ♦p.
4.4 Possibility Results for Collective Rationality at the
Level of Worlds
To complete the picture, we are now going to look for possibility results at the
level of individual worlds. Recall that, by Proposition 21, any such result we are
able to establish will immediately transfer to our other two notions of collective
rationality as well. Unlike in Section 2.5, where we proved a number of simple
possibility results for collective rationality at the level of frames for specific
graph properties, the following results apply to all graph properties that can be
expressed as modal integrity constraints meeting certain syntactic restrictions.
Recall that a formula is said to be in negation normal form (NNF) if it does
not make use of the implication operator → and the negation operator ¬ only
occurs immediately in front of propositional variables. As is well known, any
modal formula can be translated into an equivalent formula in NNF. We call a
formula in NNF that does not have any occurrences of ♦ a -formula, and a
formula in NNF without any occurrence of  a ♦-formula.
The first straightforward observation to be made is that, if a formula ϕ
does not involve any modal operators ( and ♦), then any aggregation rule
will be world collectively rational with respect to ϕ. This is immediate from
Definition 27: the truth of such a ϕ only depends on the valuation Val, which
is not subject to change during aggregation. For formulas involving only the
universal modality , we need to ensure that the frame resulting from the
aggregation does not include “too many” edges:
Proposition 22. If an aggregation rule F is such that for every profile E there
exists an individual i⋆ ∈ N such that F (E) ⊆ Ei⋆ , then F is world collectively
rational with respect to all -formulas.
Proof. The proof hinges on a basic property of -formulas, namely that of being
preserved if the set of edges in a model gets reduced by deleting some of the
edges. So let ϕ be a -formula and let E be a profile. Fix a world x ∈ V and a
valuationVal such that 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ for all i ∈ N . In particular, we have
〈〈V,Ei⋆〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ. Since, by assumption, F is such that F (E) ⊆ Ei⋆ , all
boxed formulas that are true in 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉 at x are also true in the collective
model 〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉 at x; thus, 〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ.
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Note that the individual i⋆ in Proposition 22 need not be the same in all profiles.
But of course, it can be. This observation immediately leads to the following
corollary:
Corollary 23. Any oligarchic aggregation rule is world collectively rational with
respect to all -formulas.
For formulas involving only the existential modality ♦, we have to ensure that
the collective model includes “enough” edges:
Proposition 24. If an aggregation rule F is such that for every profile E there
exists an individual i⋆ ∈ N such that F (E) ⊇ Ei⋆ , then F is world collectively
rational with respect to all ♦-formulas.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 22, this time using the
property of ♦-formulas being preserved when the set of edges in a model is
expanded by adding edges. Let ϕ be a ♦-formula and letE be a profile such that,
for a given world x ∈ V and valuation Val, we have that 〈〈V,Ei〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ
for all i ∈ N . By assumption, we know that that F (E) ⊇ Ei⋆ . Hence, from the
fact that 〈〈V,Ei⋆〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ and that ϕ is a ♦-formula we can conclude that
〈〈V, F (E)〉,Val 〉, x |= ϕ.
Examples for aggregation rules that satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 24
are the dictatorships and the union rule. Oligarchic rules (other than the dicta-
torships), however, do not. Instead, in analogy to Corollary 23, any aggregation
rule that always returns the union of the graphs provided by some fixed coalition
is world collectively rational with respect to all ♦-formulas.
Propositions 22 and 24 together suggest a sufficient condition for an aggrega-
tion rule to preserve truth for any kind of formula. Recall that a representative-
voter rule is an aggregation rule F that is such that for every profile E there
exists an individual i⋆ ∈ N such that F (E) = Ei⋆ (see Definition 7).
Proposition 25. Any representative-voter rule is world collectively rational
with respect to all modal integrity constraints.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 27: If the collective graph is a copy of one of
the individual graphs, then all formulas that are true at the individual level will
remain true at the collective level.
Proposition 25 is related to a result for binary aggregation characteris-
ing the representative-voter rules as those binary aggregation rules that
are collectively rational with respect to all propositional integrity con-
straints [Grandi and Endriss, 2013]. Interestingly, for graph aggregation and
modal integrity constraints, we do not obtain such a result; the converse of
Proposition 25 does not hold. The reason is that modal logic is not fully
expressive on graphs: it cannot distinguish between models that are bisim-
ilar [Blackburn et al., 2001]. Rather than recalling the formal definition of
bisimilarity here, we conclude by giving an example for an aggregation rule
that, despite not being a representative-voter rule, is world collectively rational
with respect to all modal integrity constraints.
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Example 15 (Aggregation and bisimilarity). Let V = {x, y} and Φ = {p}.
Suppose we are interested in world collective rationality at world x and relative
to models with valuation Val(p) = {x, y}. Let F be the aggregation rule that
is almost the dictatorship of agent 1, except that in case E1 = {(x, x), (y, y)},
rather than reproducing that graph, it returns the special graph {(x, y), (y, x)}.
The two models based on these two graphs are bisimilar: no modal formula can
distinguish them. For example, ♦♦p is true at both worlds in both of them,
while ¬p is false at both worlds in both of them. Clearly, F is world collectively
rational with respect to every modal integrity constraint, just as the dictatorship
of agent 1 is.
5 Applications in Artificial Intelligence
In Section 2.2, we introduced several scenarios that together exemplify the range
of applications in which graph aggregation can play a role. In this section, we
will revisit some of these scenarios, particularly those featuring prominently
in AI research, and show how our results, notably our general impossibility
theorems, can be put to use in these domains. Some of the results we will
present are new, but most of them instead highlight how our approach can
be used to clarify known results and to obtain significantly simpler proofs for
them. We will discuss applications of our approach to preference aggregation for
agents that are not perfectly rational (Section 5.1), to nonmonotonic reasoning
and belief merging (Section 5.2), to clustering analysis (Section 5.3), and to
abstract argumentation in multiagent systems (Section 5.4).
Recall that an Arrovian aggregation rule is a rule that is unanimous,
grounded, and IIE. We will use this terminology throughout this section. Also,
to simplify the statements of theorems, when in this section we speak of “ag-
gregation rules for X”, with X being some family of graphs, we are referring to
aggregation rules that are collectively rational with respect to the graph proper-
ties characterising X . For example, Arrow’s Theorem speaks about aggregation
rules for weak orders, i.e., aggregation rules that are collectively rational with
respect to the three graph properties defining weak orders.
5.1 Bounded Rationality: Aggregation of Incomplete
Preferences
In the economics literature, and thus in essentially all classical contributions to
social choice theory, preferences are usually assumed to be complete. Thus, for
any two alternatives, a decision maker is assumed to be able to decide which
of them she prefers or whether she is indifferent between them. In AI, on
the other hand, such an assumption would often be considered controversial.
Rather, an agent may not always be able to provide a complete preference order.
This kind of bounded rationality could be due to the agent lacking relevant
information or due to her lacking the necessary computational resources to arrive
at a complete ranking. This is particularly relevant in domains where agents are
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asked to express preferences over very large sets of alternatives. Indeed, many
of the formal preference representation languages developed in AI, such as CP-
nets [Boutilier et al., 2004], are not even able to express all complete preference
orders [Lang, 2004].
It therefore is important to understand the options available to us for ag-
gregating incomplete preferences, which are often modelled as preorders, i.e.,
binary relations that are reflexive and transitive.11 First, observe that Arrow’s
Theorem does not apply to the aggregation of such incomplete preferences. A
simple counterexample is the intersection rule, which is unanimous, grounded,
IIE, and collectively rational with respect to both reflexivity and transitivity,
i.e., it correctly maps profiles of preorders to single preorders—yet it is not a
dictatorship. Of course, the intersection rule does not qualify as a very attrac-
tive rule either. It is an oligarchic rule, and in fact we can easily prove the
following characterisation result:
Theorem 26. Let F be an aggregation rule for preferences—modelled as
preorders—over three or more alternatives. Then F is Arrovian if and only
if it is oligarchic.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from Theorem 14, as transitivity is con-
tagious and implicative, and as reflexivity permits us to reduce NR-oligarchies
to full oligarchies. The other direction is immediate.
Let us say that a preorder E has maxima if there exists at least one element
such that no other element is strictly preferred to it:
∃x.∀y.xEy (E has maxima)
Thus, the preference order modelled by E may be incomplete, but there is at
least one element that is at least as preferable as any other. Similarly, let us say
that E has minima if there exists at least one element that is at least as bad as
any other element:
∃x.∀y.yEx (E has minima)
Pini et al. [2009] study Arrovian impossibilities for incomplete preferences in de-
tail. They call an incomplete preference order (i.e., a preorder) “restricted” if it
has maxima or minima (or both). Their main result is a variant of Arrow’s The-
orem for such restricted incomplete preferences [Pini et al., 2009, Theorem 5]:
Theorem 27 (Pini et al., 2009). Any Arrovian aggregation rule for
preferences—when modelled as preorders that have maxima or minima—over
three or more alternatives must be a dictatorship.
Proof. The claim follows from Theorem 15, considering that transitivity is con-
tagious and implicative, having maxima or minima is disjunctive, and reflexivity
allows us to remove the restriction to nonreflexive edges. In other words, the
11Thus, a weak order, which we have used to model preferences up to this point, is a preorder
that is complete.
40
proof is identical to that of Theorem 18, except that now the disjunctive prop-
erty of having maxima or minima takes over the role of the disjunctive property
of completeness.
In fact, Theorem 27 is slightly stronger than the result stated by Pini et al.,
who only require preferences to be restricted in the output but admit arbitrary
preorders in the input (note that by admitting a wider range of inputs, encoun-
tering an impossibility becomes more likely). Besides making available a much
simpler proof than the one originally given by Pini et al., our approach shows
that the focus on preorders that have maxima or minima is somewhat arbitrary.
Any other property that is disjunctive, such as the strictly weaker nontriviality
property (see Table 1), would have delivered the same result.
Pini et al. also prove variants of other classical theorems, notably the Muller-
Satterthwaite Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Discussing
these results is beyond the scope of this paper. Having said this, it is well
known that in the classical setting they can be obtained as relatively simple
corollaries to Arrow’s Theorem [Endriss, 2011], so our approach is likely to have
fruitful applications also here.
5.2 Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Merging
Aggregation plays a role in several contributions to the literature on nonmono-
tonic reasoning in AI. This is the case both for models of commonsense rea-
soning for a single intelligent agent who has to aggregate the possibly con-
flicting views arising from several different inference rules [Doyle and Wellman,
1991], and for work on merging the beliefs of several agents in a multiagent
system [Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann, 2003]. In some approaches to nonmono-
tonic reasoning, alternative states of belief that an agent or a multiagent system
might adopt are structured in terms of plausibility orderings that indicate which
states are preferred to which other states according to a given criterion or a given
individual agent. Such plausibility orders (often referred to as preferences in the
literature) of course are graphs, so this boils down to a question of graph aggre-
gation.12 Plausibility orders are reflexive and transitive, i.e., they are naturally
modelled as preorders. In addition, different authors impose different additional
requirements. We now review two contributions to nonmonotonic reasoning that
involve graph aggregation.
The starting point of Doyle and Wellman [1991] is the observation that prior
attempts at integrating various specialised patterns of commonsense inference
into a universal logic of nonmonotonic reasoning have failed, and they try to ex-
plain this observation in terms of an Arrovian impossibility result for plausibility
orders. They recognise that Arrow’s Theorem does not extend to the aggrega-
tion of preorders, but also do not consider adding a completeness requirement as
12In other approaches to belief merging, belief bases themselves rather than the underlying
plausibility orders are being aggregated [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002]. These approaches
are closely related to judgment aggregation [Everaere et al., 2015], rather than graph aggre-
gation, and we shall not discuss them here.
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being appropriate in this context. Instead, besides independence and the weak
Pareto condition, they invoke one additional axiom. Doyle and Wellman call
an aggregation rule F conflict-resolving if, for all x, y ∈ V , it is the case that if
(x, y) ∈ Ei holds for at least one i ∈ N , then (x, y) ∈ F (E) or (y, x) ∈ F (E)
must hold as well. That is, if at least one agent ranks x and y, then the
output of F must rank x and y as well (but not necessarily in the same di-
rection). The main theorem of Doyle and Wellman may be paraphrased as
follows [Doyle and Wellman, 1991, Theorem 4.3]:
Theorem 28 (Doyle and Wellman, 1991). Any aggregation rule for plausibility
orders—when modelled as preorders—over three or more states of belief that is
Arrovian and conflict-resolving must be a dictatorship.
Proof. First, restrict attention to profiles where at least one agent submits a
nonempty graph. But then the claim is strictly weaker than claiming that,
for |V | > 3, any Arrovian aggregation rule for nontrivial preorders must be
dictatorial, which follows from Theorem 15 using the by now familiar approach.
Second, in case where every agent submits an empty graph, due to groundedness
the collective graph will be empty as well, i.e., also in this case the dictator gets
her will.
Doyle and Wellman prove their result by inspection of a published proof of Ar-
row’s Theorem, noting that, in that proof, collective rationality with respect to
completeness is only ever used when at least one individual expresses a pref-
erence between the relevant two alternatives. This is a valid approach, and
indeed, the result of Doyle and Wellman is the theorem most similar to Arrow’s
original result amongst all the impossibility theorems discussed in this paper.
Having said this, we believe that there is some added value in showing their
result to be an immediate corollary to another theorem (as we have done here)
rather than just showing how it follows from the proof of another theorem (as
Doyle and Wellman have done), as this makes it considerably easier for others
to verify the result and to prove similar new results themselves.
In work on belief merging, Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann [2003] model plau-
sibility orders as preorders that satisfy the property of negative transitivity
(see Table 1), which they call modularity. They argue that assuming negative
transitivity rather than completeness, together with a modification of the in-
dependence axiom, allows them to circumvent Arrow’s Theorem and to make
reasonable aggregation rules available for belief merging. In the discussion of
their result, they stress the significance of both of these changes. However, our
analysis clearly shows that replacing completeness by negative transitivity alone
has no effect on Arrow’s impossibility, as negative transitivity is also a disjunc-
tive property (see Fact 13). Hence, the crucial source for the possibility result of
Maynard-Zhang and Lehmann must be their modification of the independence
axiom. Indeed, this modification is rather substantial, as it allows for indepen-
dence to be violated whenever not doing so would lead to what they term a
“conflict”. Thus, our approach is helpful also in this context in pinpointing the
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precise sources of impossibilities, thereby providing guidance on how they can
be avoided.
5.3 Consensus Clustering
Given a set of data points, clustering is the task of partitioning that set into
subsets, in a way that in some sense is meaningful or useful [Tan et al., 2005].
For example, someone designing an advertising campaign may wish to cluster a
dataset about the past purchasing behaviour of a large group of people into a
small number of groups of people with similar characteristics. Or someone de-
signing a medical treatment may wish to cluster a medical dataset into subsets
of patients with similar symptoms. Clustering has been exceptionally success-
ful in practice, but is still lacking precise theoretical foundations. It is often
difficult—and sometimes arguably impossible—to define what would constitute
a “correct” clustering. The process of trying to find a compromise between the
output of several different clustering algorithms is known as consensus cluster-
ing. Consensus clustering can be modelled as a problem of graph aggregation.
To see this, observe that a specific clustering of a given set of data points can
be modelled as an equivalence relation (i.e., a graph) on that set, by stipulating
that two points are equivalent if and only of they belong to the same cluster.
Recall that an equivalence relation on a set V is a binary relation on V that
is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. To the best of our knowledge, Mirkin
[1975] was the first to analyse the aggregation of equivalence relations using the
axiomatic method (see also Barthe´lemy et al. [1986]). Below we state a very
similar result due to Fishburn and Rubinstein [1986], who in their paper refer
to oligarchies as “conjunctive operators”.
Theorem 29 (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1986). Any Arrovian aggregation rule
for equivalence relations—which may represent alternative clusterings of a com-
mon dataset—over three or more data points must be an oligarchy.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 14, together with the fact that transitivity is
both a contagious and an implicative graph property, and the observation that
collective rationality with respect to reflexivity eliminates the need to distinguish
between NR-oligarchic and fully oligarchic rules. The additional requirement of
collective rationality with respect to symmetry does not affect the result; in
particular, it is easy to verify that the richness conditions in the definitions of
contagiousness and implicativeness can still be met.
In fact, not every possible clustering will be useful. In particular, the clustering
that puts every single data point in its own little cluster might meet most of
the required definitions (e.g., it vacuously ensures that similarity between data
points of the same cluster is always greater than similarity between data points
belonging to different clusters), but it hardly will be helpful in understanding
the structure of the data or in using it. Note that this kind of trivial clustering
corresponds to the empty graph. Thus, we may assume that all individual
graphs are nontrivial (as defined in Table 1) and we may wish to impose the
43
same constraint on the result of the aggregation rule, i.e., we may wish to impose
collective rationality with respect to nontriviality. If we do so, we can further
tighten the impossibility result of Fishburn and Rubinstein:13
Theorem 30. Any Arrovian aggregation rule for nontrivial equivalence
relations—which may represent alternative clusterings of a common dataset—
over three or more data points must be a dictatorship.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 15, in the same way as Theorem 29 follows
from Theorem 14, together with the fact that nontriviality is a disjunctive graph
property (see Fact 13).
Thus, it is impossible to design useful algorithms for consensus clustering that
operate on each pair of data points independently.
While our approach applies to the problem of finding a consensus between
the outputs produced by several clustering algorithms, we note that there also
has been work on characterising those clustering algorithms themselves that is
based on ideas originating in social choice theory [Ackerman and Ben-David,
2008, Kleinberg, 2002].
5.4 Multiagent Argumentation
The final application scenario introduced in Section 2.2 we are going to discuss
in some more detail here is that of argumentation in multiagent systems. An
abstract argumentation framework is a graph, the vertices of which are the
arguments and the edges of which represent a so-called attack-relation between
arguments. This model was introduced in the seminal work of Dung [1995], who
proposed several different semantics for abstract argumentation frameworks that
specify principles according to which we may accept or reject arguments given
the attacks between them. For example, if we accept argument x, and if x
attacks y, then we should not also accept y.
In a multiagent system, each agent may be associated with a different ab-
stract argumentation framework on the same set of arguments, i.e., each agent
may have different views on what constitutes a valid attack. We may then wish
to merge these different frameworks to arrive at a suitable representation of
the views of the group as a whole. The aggregation of abstract argumentation
frameworks has been studied by a number of authors [Coste-Marquis et al.,
2007, Tohme´ et al., 2008, Dunne et al., 2012, Delobelle et al., 2015].14 Next,
we review some of this work and demonstrate that there are several interesting
13We are grateful to Shai Ben-David for alerting us to this connection between consensus
clustering and our Dictatorship Theorem (personal communication, June 2015).
14In related work, other authors have studied the aggregation of alternative extensions of
a given common abstract argumentation framework, i.e., alternative choices on which argu-
ments to accept [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011, Rahwan and Tohme´, 2010, Booth et al., 2014].
This line of work is more closely related to judgment aggregation and we shall not review it
here. Bodanza and Auday [2009] compare these two distinct approaches of combining abstract
argumentation and social choice theory.
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connections to our own work on graph aggregation, which suggests that graph
aggregation can be fruitfully applied also in this domain.
Coste-Marquis et al. [2007] were the first to consider the problem of ag-
gregating several argumentation frameworks. They propose a distance-based
method for aggregation. While they formulate the unanimity axiom as a rele-
vant property in the context of aggregation of argumentation frameworks, they
do not explicitly link their work to social choice theory.
Tohme´ et al. [2008] were the first to make an explicit link to social choice
theory. They formulate several choice-theoretic axioms for the aggregation of
argumentation frameworks, e.g., an independence axiom and a (strong) mono-
tonicity axiom (which is equivalent to the conjunction of our monotonicity axiom
and IIE). They study collective rationality with respect to acyclicity. Acyclicity
is an important graph property in the context of argumentation, because for an
acyclic argumentation framework it is unambiguous which arguments to accept:
accept all those that are not attacked by any argument or that are only at-
tacked by arguments that themselves are attacked by some accepted argument.
Acyclicity does not satisfy any of our three meta-properties (contagiousness,
implicativeness, disjunctiveness), so our general impossibility theorems do not
apply. Still, as Tohme´ et al. argue, the options for designing an aggregation rule
that is collectively rational with respect to acyclicity are very limited. Clearly,
every oligarchic rule is collectively rational with respect to acyclicity, because
acyclicity of graphs is preserved under intersection. In addition, as Tohme´ et al.
point out, also any aggregation rule based on a collegium, i.e., a coalition of
agents who each can veto any given edge from being accepted, but who may not
be able to jointly enforce the acceptance of an edge (as would be the case in an
oligarchy), is also collectively rational with respect to acyclicity, besides being
Arrovian.
Dunne et al. [2012] introduced further choice-theoretic axioms into the study
of the aggregation of abstract argumentation frameworks (also discussed by
Delobelle et al. [2015]). Arguably, some of their “axioms” are better charac-
terised as collective rationality requirements. For example, their “nontriviality
axiom” in fact is just collective rationality with respect to nontriviality of graphs
(as defined in Table 1). Probably the most important innovation in the work
of Dunne et al. [2012] is the introduction of collective rationality requirements
(albeit not under this name) with respect to graph properties that are specific
to the context of abstract argumentation, such as the property of being “de-
cisive” (in the sense of not permitting any ambiguity about which arguments
are to be accepted). While, as explained above, acyclicity entails decisiveness,
the converse is not true, i.e., studies of collective rationality with respect to
acyclicity can only ever approximate the properties we should postulate for an
aggregation rule for argumentation frameworks.
Modal logic can be used to define a semantics for argumentation frameworks
by specifying rules for labelling arguments in a given argumentation framework
as being either “in” or “out”, or possibly “undecided” [Caminada and Gabbay,
2009, Grossi, 2010]. This provides yet another connection to our work on graph
aggregation. Let Φ = {in, out, undec}. We can use the following formula to
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express that every argument must get labelled using exactly one of these three
options:
(in ∧ ¬out ∧ ¬undec) ∨ (¬in ∧ out ∧ ¬undec) ∨ (¬in ∧ ¬out ∧ undec)
In addition, we can express constraints on the labelling of arguments that are
linked to each other by means of the attack-relation. Let our graph describe
the inverse of the attack-relation in an argumentation framework (rather than
the attack-relation itself). Thus, the formula ♦in, for example, will be true at
a world, if that world represents an argument that is attacked by an argument
that is “in”, i.e., that is accepted. The formula out is true if all attacking
arguments are “out” (i.e., rejected). We now may wish to impose some of the
following modal integrity constraints:
• in → out (expressing that an argument can only be “in”, if all of its
attackers are “out”)
• out → in (expressing that, if all of an argument’s attackers are “out”,
then it should be “in”)
• out → ♦in (expressing that an argument should only be “out”, if one of
its attackers is “in”)
• ♦in→ out (expressing that an argument that has an attacker that is “in”
must be “out”)
A labelling that satisfies all of four of these constraints corresponds to what
Dung calls a complete extension [Dung, 1995, Caminada and Gabbay, 2009].
A labelling that furthermore does not label any argument as being undecided,
i.e., that makes ¬undec true at every world, corresponds to a so-called stable
extension [Dung, 1995, Caminada and Gabbay, 2009].
Observe that each one of the four formulas above is equivalent to either a
-formula or a ♦-formula, although the conjunction of all four is not. Thus, in
case we, for instance, are only interested in the first two of them, we can refer
to Proposition 22 to identify aggregation rules that are collectively rational
with respect to these modal integrity constraints. If, however, we require an
aggregation rule that preserves the property of having a complete (or stable)
extension, then the best we can say at this point is that, by Proposition 25, any
representative-voter rule meets this kind of requirement.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the problem of graph aggregation and analysed it in view of
its possible use to combine information coming from different agents who each
specify an alternative set of edges on the same set of vertices. Our focus has been
on the concept of collective rationality, i.e., the preservation of certain properties
of graphs under aggregation. Our results are formulated with respect to various
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meta-properties that may or may not be met by a specific property of graphs
one may be interested in. We have explored two different approaches to the
definition of such meta-properties. Using a semantic approach, we have defined
certain templates (namely contagiousness, implicativeness, and disjunctiveness),
which are easy to recognise in common graph properties and which make the
features of graph properties required to carry through our proofs particularly
salient. Using a syntactic approach, we have used formulas expressible in certain
fragments of modal logic to describe properties of graphs.
Most of our technical results establish conditions under which it is either
possible or impossible to guarantee collective rationality with respect to graph
properties that meet certain meta-properties. Our main technical result is a
generalisation of Arrow’s Theorem for preference aggregation to aggregation
problems for a large family of types of graphs that include the types of graphs
used by Arrow to model preferences. To establish this theorem, as well as a
closely related theorem identifying conditions that can only be satisfied by an
oligarchic aggregation rule, we have refined the (ultra)filter method for proving
impossibility theorems in social choice theory. Besides these technical contri-
butions, we have also demonstrated how insights from the abstract setting of
graph aggregation can be put to use in a variety of application domains.
While we have been able to demonstrate that our choice of meta-properties
is particularly useful for quickly proving results in a wide variety of differ-
ent domains, our impossibility theorems only establish sufficient conditions for
impossibilities and there is room for future research on other such sufficient
conditions and also for a complete characterisation of the family of types of
graphs for which Arrovian aggregation is impossible. A good starting point
for such an undertaking would be closely related work in judgment aggrega-
tion [Dokow and Holzman, 2010, Dietrich and List, 2007b].
Besides such technical investigations, future work should continue to focus
on applications of graph aggregation. Our discussion in Section 5 demonstrates
the usefulness of adopting the general perspective of graph aggregation in the
domains of preference aggregation, nonmonotonic reasoning and belief merging,
cluster analysis, and argumentation. Future work should also address the other
application scenarios identified in Section 2.2 and it should identify new ones.
One promising direction concerns work on theory change in the philosophy of
science, where one recent model has used the Arrovian framework of preference
aggregation to analyse how scientists choose between rival scientific theories in
terms of preferences induced by criteria such as simplicity or fit with available
data [Okasha, 2011]. The more general framework of graph aggregation opens
up new possibilities for investigating the subtle differences that presumably ex-
ist between the preferences of an economic agent and the preferences induced by
scientific criteria for accepting a novel theory. Another—entirely different but
equally promising—direction for future research is in the area of the Semantic
Web and concerns work on XML data integration [Halevy et al., 2006]. The
basic structure underlying documents encoded in XML (the extensible markup
language) is that of a tree, i.e., a special kind of graph. Thus, if we want to
combine information encoded using XML that has been obtained from different
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sources on the Semantic Web, we need to use some form of graph aggregation
as well.15 But also this extended list of potential applications is bound to be
incomplete, given the ubiquity of graphs across so much of science and scholar-
ship.
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